

# Nationalism and Patriotism in Western and Central and Eastern Europe after the Collapse of Communism<sup>1</sup>

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**ABSTRACT:** *Central to the theory of national identity is the differentiation between two specific expressions of national pride – nationalism and patriotism. Many studies commonly assumed that patriotism acquires the illiberal character of nationalism as it moves from the West of Europe to the East, changing from its more civilized and progressive forms into barbarity. This paper tests to what extent the hypothesis suggesting that people in Central and Eastern Europe are more inclined to nationalism and unable to distinguish it from a desirable attachment to one's own nation proves true based on empirical evidence. Moreover, the paper tests whether there has been a substantial difference in attitudes regarding nationalism and patriotism in the two groups of countries within time. The search for distinguishable patterns of nationalism and patriotism is performed in both groups separately. Data were drawn from the sample of eight Western European states and seven Central and Eastern European countries respectively. The findings reveal that conceptual divisions between Western and Eastern nationalism proved largely unjustified.*

**KEYWORDS:** nationalism, patriotism, national identity, post-communist countries, Europe

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*"I am a man thanks to nature; I am a Frenchman thanks to coincidence."*

**Charles-Luis de Montesquieu**

## **Introduction**

The stability, legitimacy and effectiveness of political regimes depend on the diffusion of the values which support them within the population. Some indeed argue that the prevailing political culture seems to be more essential for the functioning of political systems than its formal institutional arrangements (Almond and Verba 1963, xiii, Easton 1965, Inglehart 1988, Jaros and Canon 1969, 94). The knowledge of how certain political values become internalized by citizens is therefore of crucial importance. Some scholars (McClosky, 1964, Prothro and Grigg, 1960, Jackman and Miller, 1996, Rothstein, 2005) argue that the institutional arrangements, the nature of party systems or the values and behavior of elites have a bigger and more straightforward impact on the stability of democracy than political culture. Indeed, empirical evidence does not unequivocally support the belief that a democratic political culture is the necessary prerequisite for the establishment of a democratic regime. Nonetheless, when looking at multiple historical examples of democratic failures, once a democracy is established, its quality and survival seem to require popular legitimacy, citizen participation, acceptance of the rules of the game and policies and a necessary resistance to the allurements of anti-system movements and leaders (Slomczynski and Shabad 1998, 752). "To maintain the stability of a political system/culture, it must directly or indirectly transfer political knowledge, beliefs, opinions, attitudes, values, ideologies and behavioral intentions and predispositions from one generation to another" (Farnen and Meloen 2001, 4). Studying the conditions of effective learning of democratic norms and values, thus, advances our understanding of functioning democratic regimes. The substantial spread of democratic forms of government during the second half of the twentieth century justifies the interest in empirical research in this area.

Central to the theory of national identity is the differentiation between two specific expressions of love for the nation – nationalism and patriotism (de Figueiredo and Elkins 2003, Feshbach 1994, Habermas 1992, Kosterman and Feshbach 1989). Nationalism reflects attitudes of idealization of the nation, a feeling of national superiority, an uncritical acceptance of national, state, and political authorities, a suppression of ambivalent attitudes toward the nation, an inclination to define one's own group by criteria of descent, race, or cultural affiliation, and derogation of groups not considered to be part of the nation. On the other hand, patriotism shows attitudes of support for the system as long as the nation's aims are in accordance with

humanistic values, support for democratic principles and an advanced social system, rejection of an uncritical acceptance of state authorities and acceptance of negative nation-related emotions. The concept of patriotism used in this paper is in fact interchangeable with the concept of liberal nationalism (see Auer 2004, Miller 1995, Müller 2007, Tamir 1993). Many studies (Brown 1994, Chirot 1995, Greenfeld 1995, Schöpflin 1995, 52) after the breakdown of communism commonly assumed that patriotism acquires the illiberal character of nationalism as it moves from the West of Europe to the East, changing from its more civilized and progressive forms into barbarity. It was assumed that patriotism with his advancement of attachments towards liberal democratic institutions would simply not be an option for countries lacking any democratic tradition (Auer 2004, viii). This paper tests to what extent the hypothesis that people in Central and Eastern Europe are more inclined to nationalism and are unable to distinguish it from a desirable attachment to one's own nation proves true based on empirical evidence.

Finding that people of Central and Eastern Europe are able to identify themselves with patriotic attitudes would contradict a commonly held assumption present in numerous studies (Brown 1994, Chirot 1995, Greenfeld 1995, Schöpflin 1995, 52) about nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe. There are good reasons for increased interest in patriotism and nationalism in Europe. There is concern over the rising xenophobia and increased support for the far right political parties which are emphasizing ethnic issues. However, social surveys have shown an interesting finding of high levels of national pride not preventing high levels of European pride (Eurobarometer March 2002, 34). In fact, although one might think about the two concepts as mutually exclusive, a weak but positive, statistically significant correlation between the two feelings has been found (Eurobarometer March 2002, 34). Therefore, patriotism may potentially influence positive attitudes toward European integration and can be conducive to the project of European unification (Auer 2004, ix). As further integration increases the flow of peoples across national borders and the influence of foreign policymakers on domestic politics, patriotic and nationalistic attitudes will likely have a greater effect on EU support. The finding of present patriotic attitudes among Central and Eastern Europeans could reveal that the ambitious project of European unification seems feasible also for the New Member States, in this study represented by a number of Central and Eastern European countries.

Firstly, variables from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 1995 and 2003 National Identity Module to measure nationalism and patriotism were chosen based on the literature. Secondly, using exploratory factor analysis the search for distinguishable patterns of nationalism and patriotism is performed in the sample of eight "Western" European states and seven Central and Eastern European countries respectively. The paper also tests whether there

has been a substantial difference in attitudes regarding nationalism and patriotism in the two groups of countries within time.

At one extreme, if the exploratory factor analysis shows a clear distinction between two factors of patriotism and nationalism in the Western countries, suggesting that the two do not go together and there is no necessary connection, the results will support the assumption of Western Europeans being able to distinguish between the two constructs. On the other hand, a relatively blurry distinction between nationalism and patriotisms in these countries would suggest people in Western Europe are not only patriotic, but their patriotism is closely connected with nationalism, which would be a problematic finding for the theories working with the conceptual division of Europe into East and West. In a similar way, obtaining a relatively sharp separation between two factors representing nationalism and patriotism for the group of the Central and Eastern European countries would mean that people in Central and Eastern Europe are able to distinguish between patriotism and nationalism. Therefore, one could assume that an attachment to one's own country in Central and Eastern Europe does not necessarily mean an inclination to extremist nationalism unlike many studies assumed, since individuals can still feel proud of the country where they belong by their citizenship, while not thinking about the nation in only exclusivist terms and not necessarily identifying themselves with superior attitudes towards other countries.

### **Theories of nationalism and patriotism**

National identity and the sense of belonging to a nation are among the crucial group identities, while in general the nation state is taken for one of the core political - and often also cultural - units. Hence, a nation is a psychological construct (Anderson 1991, Heywood 2004, 127) and a political product, set apart from other groups by virtue of its members' considering themselves a nation. A nation views itself as an independent, special political community that is different from the other entities, this setting it apart from, say, an ethnic group. From the psychological viewpoint, a nation is a group of people sharing loyalties or emotional bonds in the form of patriotism or nationalism. Attachment of group members toward their country is expressed by a sense of belonging, love, loyalty, pride, and care toward the group and land (Bar-Tal 1997, 246). However, this emotional bond is not a necessary condition of the feeling of allegiance to a nation; even people who do not feel national pride may admit they "belong" to a nation (Heywood 2004, 127).

Nationalism encourages attitudes involving liking one's own group and disliking certain other groups (Druckman 1994, 63 - 64). The pursuers of this idea insist on the need of maintaining

cultural purity and traditions, something which may lead to perceiving immigrants and strangers as a threat, thereby promoting or at least giving a semblance of legitimacy to racism and xenophobia. There is a sharp division between “us” and “them” and sometimes this split is carried to the extreme as “they” are the foes that need to be hated or ridiculed. Once “they” are clearly identified, the awareness about “us” is strengthened and the identities are experienced with more intensity. According to Heywood we can actually observe a type of “negative integration” (Heywood 2004, 138). Schatz, Staub and Lavine (1999) define nationalism as feeling of national superiority and support for national dominance. In line with this definition, the conceptualization of nationalism in this study reflects attitudes of idealization of the nation, a feeling of national superiority, an uncritical acceptance of national, state, and political authorities, a suppression of ambivalent attitudes toward the nation, an inclination to define one’s own group by criteria of descent, race, or cultural affiliation, and derogation of groups not considered to be part of the nation.

Druckman characterizes patriotism as strong loyalty and attachments to one’s own group without the corresponding hostility toward other groups (Druckman 1994). Michnik argued that from the perspective of patriotism the nation is not idealized, but critically evaluated (Michnik 1993, 151) and likewise Pithart sees patriotism as a positive relation to the national community that does not need to be strengthened by the existence of any imaginary or real enemy (Pithart 1998, 38 – 39). Patriotism is easily replaceable with what some theorists call liberal nationalism (Auer 2004, Tamir 1993, Miller 1995, Müller 2007). This brand of nationalism does not attempt to put the interests of one nation above those of another and supports the concept of equality of all nations. The idea is to build a world consisting of sovereign national states. From this vantage point, nationalism provides the mechanics of achieving a peaceful, stable world order (Heywood 2004, 134). Liberal nationalism theorists, such as Tamir strive to prove that various forms of nationalism are compatible with core liberal values, and that is why these forms are still necessary in order to support and sustain liberal democracy, since neither democratic states nor most individuals can or wish to lose the feeling of belonging to a nation (Tamir 1993).

Thus, the questions selected to measure patriotism should show attitudes of support for the system as long as the nation’s aims are in accordance with humanistic values, support for democratic principles and an advanced social system, rejection of an uncritical acceptance of state authorities and acceptance of negative nation-related emotions.

Studies on nationalism and its role in Central European politics and culture often work with the division of Europe to, on the one hand, a civilized West, whose nationalism was regarded as something more civilized and progressive, naturally advancing towards liberal democracy, and on

the other hand a “backwardness” (Schöpflin 1995, 49; 51) of the East whose nationalism borders on barbarism (Auer 2004, viii - ix). Many scholars (Brown 1994, Chirot 1995, Greenfeld 1995, Schöpflin 1995, 52) argue, in accordance with the above division, that because of the lack of strong democratic traditions, people in Central and Eastern Europe are especially inclined to what is defined as extremist nationalism. “Nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe acquired an exclusive, messianic quality that it did not have in the West” (Schöpflin 1995, 52). It was thought this type of nationalism would seriously jeopardize both the process of transition to democracy and the chance to install a stable, liberal democratic order and the stamina to “return to Europe”. “Those who claim that the end of the Soviet Empire will produce liberal societies make too many assumptions about the shared cultural legacies between Eastern and Western Europe” (Chirot 1995, 43). Ironically, this division has been accepted even by the Central European nations, many of which often try to distance themselves from the “barbaric” East (often symbolized by Russian Stalinism, modern Russia and recently also the Balkans). They stress their (actual or hypothetical) allegiance to the West by protesting liberal and democratic values are part and parcel of their cultures. There emerges a “new nationalist myth” – the widespread conviction about the Central European nations robbed of their real identity only due to an unfavorable historical event, namely Yalta (e.g. Kundera 2000; Miłoś 1968).

### **Data and methodology**

In this study, data from the International Social Survey Programme 1995: National Identity (ISSP 1995) and International Social Survey Programme 2003: National Identity (ISSP 2003) Modules were considered. The International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) conducts cross-national survey attitudinal research. The 1995 National Identity Module was conducted between November 1994 and June 1996 in 24 countries and the 2003 National Identity Module survey from 2003 to 2005 in 34 countries.

For the present purposes, data from fifteen countries are applied. Since the large set of countries in both the International Social Survey Programme 1995 and 2003 datasets included countries from different regions, the first selection criterion is, naturally, whether a country is a European country or not. All the non-European countries have been eliminated. Those that were not included in both datasets were also excluded. Such exclusion led to a set of 16 countries. Data for Germany were collected separately for the territories of the old Federal Republic of Germany (BRD) and the former German Democratic Republic (DDR) due to their immense differences in political and economic developments since Second World War. For the purpose of this research I did not find East Germany as a relevant source of data due to its affiliation with

the Soviet sphere of influence in the past, but as well its later unification with the old Federal Republic, making its experience unique within the Central and Eastern European group.

The representation of Western European countries is higher since the datasets provide data only for seven Central and Eastern European countries. In the end eight countries were gathered in the Western European group – West Germany (for the purpose of simplification referred to as “Germany” in further text), Great Britain, Austria, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Spain. These countries represent different types in their perception of the nation, their openness towards immigration and multiculturalism and their national hetero/homogeneity. Therefore, they constitute a good sample with a lot of variation for measuring feelings connected to the love for a nation in Western Europe. The seven countries of the Central and Eastern European group – Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Latvia and Slovakia – are also the “New” EU Member States. These countries differ in the level of national hetero/homogeneity and their openness towards immigrants as well.

The number of cases in individual countries was around 1000 respondents. The sampling procedures differed for the individual countries; samples were partly simple, partly multi-stage stratified random samples of respondents fourteen years and older for 1995 and eighteen years old and older for 2003.

As Coenders and Scheepers (2003) rightly point out, when studying attitudes of individuals on ethnic intolerance such as the attitude towards ethnic minorities, one should make a distinction between respondents from the majority group and those from the minority in each country. It is clear that the answers of the respondents from the minority group or non-citizens on variables measuring forms of national pride will probably differ from those respondents that are part of the majority group, thus affecting the overall results. For this reasons, the respondents that were part of a minority group in their respective country were omitted from the analysis.

In most of the samples, the ethnic group of the respondent was measured by a construction of a variable with a list of the major ethnic group and respondents were asked to place themselves on this list. In order to select citizens that were part of the majority ethnic group of a specific country, I constructed a dummy variable for each country separately dividing respondents into two categories according to their placement. A new variable grouping all the respondents being part of a majority ethnic group in their corresponding country was therefore constructed, setting aside all the other respondents from any further analysis. However, in some samples the variable with the list of ethnic group was not available. In this case, respondents were selected according to their answers on the questions whether they are citizens of the respective country or if both

parents were citizens of the specific country at the time the respondent was born. Tables I and II summarize the data on the final sample sizes for each country for both datasets.

### Conceptualization and measurement

“Theories of nationalism have been developed by different disciplines and are related to different level of explanation” (Weiss 2003, 379). Moreover, the literature frequently applies overlapping meanings to the concept of nationalism, liberal nationalism (for the discussion of the concept see for example Auer 2004, Tamir 1993, Miller 1995, Müller 2007), patriotism, ethnocentrism and xenophobia. Empirical manifestations of the concept of national pride suggest its multidimensionality (Kosterman and Feshbach 1989, Feshbach 1994, de Figueiredo and Elkins 2003). The conceptualization and empirical separation of nationalism and patriotism by Kosterman and Feshbach (1989) has been taken into consideration for the preparation of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) national identity module (Blank and Schmidt 2003). De Figueiredo and Elkins (2003) write, “A central distinction between the concepts [patriotism and nationalism] is their point of reference. Whereas patriotism is *self-referential*, feelings of nationalism are inherently *comparative* – and, almost exclusively, down-wardly comparative.”

Guided by the a priori criteria, ISSP national pride items were classified as measures of patriotism or nationalism. Nine questions from the ISSP National Identity Module referring to the superiority of one’s own country and its residents are used. Other seven questions from the ISSP National Identity Module related to civic or political pride (patriotism) are used. Since nationalism and patriotism are seen as opposed concepts, questions were chosen not only after consulting the literature, but in such a way that a respondent with highly nationalist attitudes could not automatically score high on questions regarding patriotism as well. Table III shows these assignments. For some items, the decision of assignment to one of the concepts conform the decisions made by other researchers, thus adding to the sense of content validity. The items used in the nationalism scale were used by Coenders and Scheepers (2003) (items 1, 3 and 4), Řeháková and Vlachová (2004) (items 1, 2 and 3) and Davidov (2008) (items 1 and 2). Items used in the patriotism scale were used by Hjerm (1998) (items 1, 2, 3 and 6), Coenders and Scheepers (2003) (items 1 and 6) and Davidov (item 1). The overall subscales to measure nationalism and patriotism were slightly modified for the present purposes. The statistical reliability of the subscales indicated Cronbach’s  $\alpha$ s of .797 (1995 dataset) and .787 for nationalism and .752 (1995 dataset) and .741 (2003 dataset) for patriotism. Therefore, both subscales were statistically reliable. A separate treatment of the subscales, that is to say theoretical expectations of two



distinct patterns within the given items is justified if none of the correlations exceeds the border of .80. The correlations did not violate the requirement; they were low to modest (Pearson's  $r$  varied from -.03 to .57 for 1995 and from -.08 to .56 for 2003).

## Results

Firstly, as in most datasets, the information has been missing on some cases on some of the used variables. This should not be considered a nuisance. The incomplete cases for the variables under study reached 21.2% for the 1995 dataset and 15.7% for the 2003 dataset. A simple listwise deletion of such cases would exclude a large fraction of the original sample, since when analyzing multiple variables listwise deletion removes cases with missing value on any of the variables. Since the sample size has been already reduced due to the exclusion of the respondents from ethnic minorities, further loss of data would not be desirable. Therefore, replacing the missing values with the multiple imputation method seemed more convenient. However, replacing the missing values with for example mean substitution as applied by certain researchers (see for example Dekker et al. 2003) did not seem a suitable solution, since it might produce biased results. Hence, the Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) in Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) with multiply imputed data has been chosen as an appropriate solution to correct for missing data. The ESEM approach has recently been implemented in the *Mplus* program. The multiple imputation method simulated and imputed missing values multiple times (for the purpose of this analysis the number of multiple imputations has been set at  $n = 20$ ) creating 20 complete datasets. The results were therefore combined to get unbiased estimates. The full list of auxiliary variables used for the imputation models can be found in Table IV.

All the available variables that can theoretically predict the values of the missing data (or the pattern of missing data) should be included. This is especially important since the Exploratory Factor Analysis does not include many of the traditional predictors used. These are *age*, *sex*, *education* (measured in years of schooling) and *current employment status*. For the variable that indicates whether a respondent is currently employed the respondents that were unemployed were further divided into four categories: retired/pensioner, housewife not otherwise employed, student, helping family member, permanently disabled and unemployed. Those employed were further divided into three categories: full time employee, part time employee and less than part-time employed. To avoid small class frequencies, I combined the categories "less than part-time employed", "helping family member" and "other, not in labor force", resulting into eight nominal class-classifications. Moreover, the variables were dichotomized. That is, the original variable was decomposed into as many variables as it contained categories, minus one used as a reference

category (in this case the category “permanently disabled”). I have not used the commonly applied *income* variable, which in the ISSP was measured by income of the household in respective country currency. This way, cross-national comparability within countries is hard to achieve. Moreover, since the respondents were asked to include all incomes within a household, it is impossible to distinguish between single-person households and other households with more members but the same household income. Therefore, I have chosen to omit the income variable. On the other hand, I have included the variables *religious denomination*, *rural/urban area of living* and *years lived in other countries*. The variable *religious denomination* was included since few studies have shown that members of diverse religious traditions tend to define political tolerance quite differently (Jelen and Wilcox, 1990) or that the stronger people subscribe to religious particularism, the stronger their prejudice is (Scheepers, Gijsberts and Hello 2002). The variable *rural/urban area of living* was included since one might assume that people living in bigger cities and therefore more frequently facing an encounter with members of ethnic minorities in general might be more resistant towards nationalist tendencies (or on the contrary this effect might be even strengthened). Nevertheless, one might reasonably expect the type of community a person is living in to have an impact on his or hers nationalist and patriotic attitudes. The same applies to the variable *years lived in other countries*. A respondent experiencing a direct confrontation with other culture might be influenced by this experience regarding his nationalist or patriotic views.

Thus, Exploratory Factor Analyses in Structural Equation Modelling (ESEM) with the sixteen variables measuring nationalism and patriotism described above were run for the Western and Central and Eastern countries separately in order to seek for any underlying latent variables that are reflected in the manifest variables. This type of exploratory model, allowing the items to load on either factor, serves as a rough guide to the structure of the measurement items (de Figueiredo and Elkins 2003, 179). “ESEM gives access to all the usual SEM parameters and the loading rotation gives a transformation of structural coefficients as well. Standard errors and overall tests of model fit are obtained” (Asparouhov and Muthén, 2009, 397). The samples are then realized based on Geomin rotation. The reason why an ESEM with Geomin rotation was performed instead of a Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) is that since CFA strictly requires zero cross-loadings which in turn can lead to misspecification of zero loadings and usually to “distorted factors with overestimated factor correlations and subsequent distorted structural relations” (Asparouhov and Muthén, 2009, 397). The Geomin rotation criterion seems to be the most promising rotation criterion when little is known about the true loading structure (Asparouhov and Muthén, 2009, 407). On the other hand it is not appropriate for more complicated matrix structures with three or more factors. The present interpreted rotated factor matrix is the one

with an oblique version of the rotation, which allows the factors to correlate with each other. However, one has to keep in mind that the factor loadings are used to intuit the meaning of factors, which means that different meanings may be ascribed to the factors depending on the rotation. I began the analysis by assuming that there are two factors for national pride, but otherwise impose no structure on the way the indicators combine. Of course, the number of factors is an issue in itself. However, the choice of two factors fits the theoretical model. Reported are the standardized factor loadings in order to ensure comparability across the differently scaled items (see Bollen 1989). In Tables V, VI, VII and VIII the numbers show loadings higher than 0.3 (that can be regarded as significantly high) on each variable for the two factors retained for the rotated factor matrix.

Firstly, the analysis of the Central and Eastern European countries in 1995 and 2003 was performed. According to the results, (Table V and Table VI), allowing each indicator to load on two factors produces a pattern of factor loadings that which appear, contrary to the expectations of the hypothesis tested, to represent patriotism and nationalism. With some exceptions, the items identified with either patriotism or nationalism load more heavily on that latent variable than they do on the other. Fourteen of the sixteen items in the 1995 dataset and thirteen of the sixteen items in the 2003 dataset load heaviest on the predicted latent variable.

As Table V shows, the first factor for the 1995 dataset has significant loadings on six of the nine variables measuring nationalism – with two having remarkably high loadings of .724 and .719 for the items “The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the (COUNTRY NATIONALITY)” and “Generally speaking, (COUNTRY) is a better country than most other countries” respectively. This yields to the conclusion that the first factor points to a latent nationalist attitude.

The second factor seems to point to a latent patriotic attitude, since it scores high on six of the seven variables measuring patriotism. However, what is worth the attention is that the factor loads high also on two variables measuring nationalism, more specifically on the variables “How proud is the respondent of (COUNTRY’S) political influence in the world” with a very high loading of .695 and “How proud is the respondent of (COUNTRY’S) armed forces” with a moderate loading of .387. The variable “How proud is the respondent of (COUNTRY’S) history” did not have high loadings for neither of the two factors. What is a somehow surprising result is the fact that the variable loading the most within the patriotic factor is “How proud is the respondent of (COUNTRY) of economic achievements” with a very high loading of .789. This might be given by the fact that the citizens of post-communist countries may have perceived the transition towards a market economy as a question of a national pride after being “imposed”

the central planned economy from the “outside”, namely from the communist Soviet Union. This argument may also be valid for the high loading of .668 of the item “How proud is the respondent of (COUNTRY) of social and security system”, when the postcommunist countries could be priding themselves to achieve the market economy without excessive social shocks. The high loading of the item “How proud is the respondent of (COUNTRY) of way democracy works” can be attributed to the fact that many of the Central and Eastern European countries present in the analysis try to stress and reclaim their (actual or hypothetical) traditional affinity to the West and state that liberal and democratic values constitute an indelible part of their culture as discussed earlier. Thus, the transition to democracy symbolized the return, as most people believed, to “Europe” after “Eastern” dominance.

The 2003 dataset shows very similar factor solutions. The first factor loads significantly on six of the nine variables measuring nationalism. The second factor scored high on five of the seven variables measuring patriotism, with remarkably high loadings of .727 for the variable “How proud is the respondent of (COUNTRY) of economic achievements” and high loadings of .664 and .610 for the variables “How proud is the respondent of (COUNTRY) of way democracy works” and “How proud is the respondent of (COUNTRY) of social and security system” respectively. What seems to be the most interesting finding is the fact that similarly to the 1995 dataset, the factor yields high loadings on the items “How proud is the respondent of (COUNTRY’S) political influence in the world” and “How proud is the respondent of (COUNTRY’S) armed forces”. This fact might lead to the conclusion, contrary to de Figueiredo and Elkin’s (2003) expectations that these questions might be hard to categorize. Even though they both contain an implicit evaluation with the “outside group”, they might be interpreted by the respondents more as an evaluation of the country’s institutions and founding principles.

The fact that the second factor seems to point to a latent patriotic attitude in both datasets suggests that the theory of people in Central and Eastern Europe being inclined to what is called illiberal nationalism and not being able to distinguish it from “healthy” patriotism might be wrong, which is alarming, since an entire literature is based on the previously disproven claim. The RMSEA is .083 for both the 1995 and the 2003 dataset. Thus, both models are fitting. I report the RMSEA since the chi-square is not valid in large samples (see de Figueiredo and Elkin’s 2003). All reported factor loadings are significant at 1%. The correlation among latent variables showed that the two concepts are measuring two distinct patterns ( $r = .432$  for 1995 and  $r = .323$  for 2003).

The same analysis has been performed for the Western European group of countries as well. As previously, two factors were retained for the purpose of the analysis. The results are displayed

in Table VII. and VIII. Again, with some exceptions, the items identified with either patriotism or nationalism load more heavily on that latent variable than they do on the other. Fourteen of the sixteen items in the 1995 dataset and fifteen of the sixteen items in the 2003 dataset load heaviest on the predicted latent variable.

In the case of the 1995 dataset for Western Europe, the factors loaded almost perfectly according to the expected distinction on the items previously identified as either measuring nationalism or patriotism. Both of the nationalism and patriotism factors did not load high only on two items – “How proud is the respondent of (COUNTRY’S) history” and “How important is it to respect (COUNTRY’S) political institutions and laws” respectively. This, as one shall see from all the results, has been a general pattern for all the two groups except for the case of the Western European countries in 2003. Intrinsically, both factors loaded on the item “How proud is the respondent of (COUNTRY’S) political influence in the world”, with the nationalism item having a moderate loading of .388 and the patriotism item having a surprisingly high loading of .638.

In the case of the 2003 dataset presented in Table VIII, the first factor has loaded high on almost all the nationalism variables; however, we can see that the loadings are especially high for the variable “The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the (COUNTRY NATIONALITY)”. What seems to be in fact the most interesting finding is that, similarly to the situation with the Central and Eastern European countries, two of the variables originally intended to measure nationalism - “How proud is the respondent of (COUNTRY’S) political influence in the world” and “How proud is the respondent of (COUNTRY’S) armed forces” – except for the Western European countries of 1995 factor matrix which did not load on “How proud is the respondent of (COUNTRY’S) armed forces”, did not load high on the nationalism factor but, on the contrary, on the factor representing patriotism. The fact that this situation occurred in both groups of the countries suggests that the loadings do not point to a specific feature of one of the groups, as much as to the fact that the items seem to be measuring patriotic instead of nationalist attitudes. Exploratory factor analysis gives the confidence that a two-factor model with two dimensions – nationalism and patriotism- makes sense. However, confirmatory factor analysis, in which items measures of the two dimensions would be stipulated, would allow to test the dimensionality further and to evaluate individual measures more precisely. However, the confirmatory factor analysis goes beyond the possibilities of the present study. The second factor loaded high on all the patriotism items except the item “How important is it to respect (COUNTRY’S) political institutions and laws”, which did not load on neither of the two factors.

The Goodness-of-fit Index indicates a fitting model (RMSEA = .083 for the 1995 dataset and = .072 for the 2003 dataset). The correlations among latent variables showed that the two concepts are measuring two distinct patterns ( $r = .318$  for 1995 and  $r = .373$  for 2003).

Thus, we can conclude that the pattern of factor loadings for the Western European group also appears, based on the expectations described above, to represent patriotism and nationalism. Such a finding was expected based on previous research; however, it was useful to test the multidimensionality of the national pride concept also in the Western European group in order to provide comparison between the two different groups of countries.

### **Conclusion**

Cross-national comparisons certainly face several limitations. To begin with, the analyses conducted are based on the data collected using different survey procedures (oral to postal interview) over an extended period of time (1994-1996) and (2003-2005) with different sampling procedures. Apart from these problems usually associated with large-scale surveys, trying to find cross-national patterns in terms of nationalism and patriotism is difficult due to these attitudes being context-dependent. Respondents in various countries might interpret them differently and thus the variables might measure different aspects. Moreover, the framing of the questions and their different understanding in various contexts poses a serious limitation to generalizations as well. However, "it is the very intention of cross-national comparisons to reveal latent patterns and their determinants, together underlying situational differences" (Weiss 2003, 385).

The central question of the present study has been whether responses to national pride items hang together in two dimensions that are recognizable as patriotism and nationalism not only within the Western European countries, but, contrary to most of the researchers' expectations, also in Central and Eastern Europe. The finding that the two factors' correlation for the East dropped from  $r = .432$  in 1995 to  $r = .323$  in 2003 when the two factors were even less correlated than in the Western European countries ( $r = .353$ ) confirms changing tendencies within time, however still presenting a clear demarcation line between the two concepts. Indeed, it is more probable that the approach to nationalism and patriotism in each country differentiates within time, not within geographical location. The nature of nationalism is impacted by the situation from which it originates as well as by the political intentions it is associated with. Moreover, there are certainly differences within the groups this paper is dealing with. One should always be careful when making an aggregation of different country level scores. It is highly probable that the attitudes of patriotism and nationalism in for example the Czech Republic are different from those in Hungary. Clearly, it might be dangerous treating a group of countries as

homogeneous groups based only on their geographical location or similar, but not same, past. However, this paper wants to empirically address a “theoretical aggregation” made by scholars when putting these counties in opposing blocks without making reference to the differences within them. The two factors in the analysis of the Western European states show a clear demarcation line between nationalist and patriotic dimensions. The second question addressed by the present paper is how valid are the individual measures of the two dimensions? What is interesting is the fact that two items originally intended to measure nationalism and mostly used by other researchers loaded highly on the factor representing patriotism. The two items therefore appear to be a clearer indicator of patriotism.

What is unique about the empirical analysis is that, unlike most of the research testing the multidimensionality of the national pride item, it accounts for problem with missing data that can seriously distort the findings. Most of the researchers usually ignore the problem by applying listwise deletion of cases with missing responses on one (or more) of the many items. This, however, leads to a significant reduction of the sample sizes. By using exploratory structural equation models with multiply imputed data such a problem is overcome, thus presumably leading to more accurate results.

What is conceptualized and measured as patriotism in the present study is the love for one’s nation as long as it emphasizes general liberal and humanistic values. Since the findings show that there has been a clear demarcation between nationalistic and patriotic attitudes in the Central and Eastern European countries in both time periods, it would be quite misleading to blame the “predisposition” to a chauvinistic nationalism for the rise of non-liberal regimes in Central and Eastern Europe. As Hroch (1993, 609) rightly observed already right after the fall of Communism from his historical perspective that; “the emergence of nations, national identities and nationalism is not a specifically Eastern development, but part of an overall European development, naturally including some typological differences and a high degree of unevenness in time”. There are more complex and less unambiguous ways to approach the various manifestations of nationalism than those enabled by any dualistic classification. The character of a national culture and its history actually defies its simple classification as liberal or non-liberal.

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**Table I. Selection of respondents from ethnic majority groups (1995)**

Country	Sample size	Ethnic majority group "Label"	(%)	Final sample size
West Germany*	1282	Parents citizens of country	90,3%	1158
Great Britain	1058	Parents citizens of country	91,2%	965
Austria	1007	Austrian	97,1%	978
Hungary	1000	Parents citizens of country	98,6%	986
Ireland	994	Irish/Irish Gaelic	99,0%	984
Netherlands	2089	Dutch, Frisian, Flemish	96,2%	2010
Norway	1527	Norwegian	95,2%	1453
Sweden	1296	Swedish	91,4%	1185
Czech Republic	1111	Czech	79,3%	881
Slovenia	1036	Slovenian	92,0%	953
Poland	1598	Parents citizens of country	97,9%	1564
Bulgaria	1105	Bulgarian	83,9%	927
Spain	1221	Parents citizens of country	99,8%	1218
Latvia	1044	Latvian, Baltic	59,1%	617
Slovakia	1388	Slovak	87,4%	1213
Total	18756	Ethnic majority group	91,1%	17092

**Table II. Selection of respondents from ethnic majority groups (2003)**

Country	Sample size	Ethnic majority group “Label”	(%)	Final sample size
West Germany	850	Parents citizens of country	76,5%	650
Great Britain	873	Parents citizens of country	97,0%	847
Austria	1006	Parents citizens of country	76,8%	773
Hungary	1021	Parents citizens of country	98,0%	1001
Ireland	1065	Irish/Irish Gaelic	96,2%	1024
Netherlands	1823	Dutch, Frisian, Flemish	93,3%	1701
Norway	1469	Norwegian	93,0%	1366
Sweden	1186	Swedish	91,5%	1085
Czech Republic	1276	Czech	86,4%	1103
Slovenia	1093	Slovenian	91,2%	997
Poland	1277	Parents citizens of country	100,0%	1277
Bulgaria	1069	Bulgarian	85,9%	918
Spain	1212	Parents citizens of country	96,9%	1175
Latvia	1000	Latvian, Baltic	58,6%	586
Slovakia	1152	Slovak	89,3%	1029
Total	17372	Ethnic majority group	89,4%	15532

**Table III. Indicators of dimensions of nationalism and patriotism**

Nationalism
(1) The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the (COUNTRY NATIONALITY)
(2) Generally speaking, (COUNTRY) is a better country than most other countries
(3) People should support their country even if (COUNTRY) is wrong
(4) Rather be a citizen of respondent's (COUNTRY) than other
(5) How proud is the respondent of (COUNTRY'S) political influence in the world
(6) How proud is the respondent of (COUNTRY'S) armed forces
(7) How proud is the respondent of (COUNTRY'S) history
(8) (COUNTRY) should follow own interests even if it leads to conflicts
(9) It is impossible for people who do not share (COUNTRY'S) customs and traditions to become fully (COUNTRY NATIONALITY)
Patriotism
(1) How proud is the respondent of (COUNTRY) of way democracy works
(2) How proud is the respondent of (COUNTRY) of fair treatment of groups in society
(3) How proud is the respondent of (COUNTRY) of social and security system
(4) How proud is the respondent of (COUNTRY) of science and technology achievements
(5) How proud is the respondent of (COUNTRY) of achievements in arts
(6) How proud is the respondent of (COUNTRY) of economic achievements
(7) How important is it to respect (COUNTRY's) political institutions and laws

**Table IV. List of auxiliary variables used for the imputation models**

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- (1) Age of respondent
- (2) Sex of respondent
- (3) How many years in general have you studied? (Consider years from primary school to university grades)
- (4) Current employment status – current economic position, main source of living
- Full time employed, main job
  - Part time employed, main job
  - Less than part time employed, helping family member, other, not in labor force
  - Unemployed
  - Student, at school, in education, vocational training
  - Retired
  - Housewife
- (5) Religious denomination – Which religious group do you belong to?
- No religion
  - Roman Catholic
  - Protestant
  - Christian Orthodox
  - Jewish
  - Islam
  - Other religion (Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh, Shinto etc.)
- (6) About how long altogether have you lived in other countries?
- (7) Do you live in a rural or urban area?
- Urban + suburbs city/town
  - Suburbs, city-town
  - Rural
-

**Table V. Rotated factor matrix for the selected 2 factors in the Central and Eastern European countries 1995**

	Rotated Factor Matrix	
	I.	II.
Rather be a citizen of respondent's country than other	0.472	
The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the (COUNTRY NATIONALITY)	0.724	
Generally speaking, (COUNTRY) is a better country than most other countries	0.719	
People should support their country even if wrong	0.548	
It is impossible for people who do not share (COUNTRY'S) customs and traditions to become fully (COUNTRY NATIONALITY)	0.435	
(COUNTRY) should follow own interests even if it leads to conflicts	0.526	
How proud is the respondent of (COUNTRY'S) political influence in the world		0.695
How proud is the respondent of (COUNTRY'S) armed forces		0.387
How proud is the respondent of (COUNTRY'S) history		
How important is it to respect (COUNTRY's) political institutions and laws		
How proud is the respondent of (COUNTRY) of way democracy works		0.645
How proud is the respondent of (COUNTRY) of economic achievements		0.789
How proud is the respondent of (COUNTRY) of social and security system		0.668
How proud is the respondent of (COUNTRY) of science and technology achievements		0.452
How proud is the respondent of (COUNTRY) of achievements in arts		0.324
How proud is the respondent of (COUNTRY) of fair treatment of groups in society		0.458

**Table VI. Rotated factor matrix for the selected 2 factors in the Central and Eastern European countries 2003**

Rotated Factor Matrix		
	I.	II.
Rather be a citizen of respondent's country than other	0.567	
The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the (COUNTRY NATIONALITY)	0.705	
Generally speaking, (COUNTRY) is a better country than most other countries	0.686	
People should support their country even if wrong	0.551	
It is impossible for people who do not share (COUNTRY'S) customs and traditions to become fully (COUNTRY NATIONALITY)	0.443	
(COUNTRY) should follow own interests even if it leads to conflicts	0.457	
How proud is the respondent of (COUNTRY'S) political influence in the world		0.662
How proud is the respondent of (COUNTRY'S) armed forces		0.376
How proud is the respondent of (COUNTRY'S) history		
How important is it to respect (COUNTRY's) political institutions and laws		
How proud is the respondent of (COUNTRY) of way democracy works		0.664
How proud is the respondent of (COUNTRY) of economic achievements		0.727
How proud is the respondent of (COUNTRY) of social and security system		0.610
How proud is the respondent of (COUNTRY) of science and technology achievements		0.386
How proud is the respondent of (COUNTRY) of achievements in arts		0.350
How proud is the respondent of (COUNTRY) of fair treatment of groups in society		



**Table VII. Rotated factor matrix for the selected 2 factors in the Western countries 1995**

Rotated Factor Matrix		
	I.	II.
Rather be a citizen of respondent's country than other	0.531	
The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the (COUNTRY NATIONALITY)	0.713	
Generally speaking, (COUNTRY) is a better country than most other countries	0.648	
People should support their country even if wrong	0.586	
It is impossible for people who do not share (COUNTRY'S) customs and traditions to become fully (COUNTRY NATIONALITY)	0.429	
(COUNTRY) should follow own interests even if it leads to conflicts	0.563	
How proud is the respondent of (COUNTRY'S) political influence in the world	0.388	0.638
How proud is the respondent of (COUNTRY'S) armed forces	0.389	
How proud is the respondent of (COUNTRY'S) history		
How important is it to respect (COUNTRY's) political institutions and laws		
How proud is the respondent of (COUNTRY) of way democracy works		0.696
How proud is the respondent of (COUNTRY) of economic achievements		0.655
How proud is the respondent of (COUNTRY) of social and security system		0.597
How proud is the respondent of (COUNTRY) of science and technology achievements		0.435
How proud is the respondent of (COUNTRY) of achievements in arts		0.338
How proud is the respondent of (COUNTRY) of fair treatment of groups in society		0.493

**Table VIII. Rotated factor matrix for the selected 2 factors in the Western countries 2003**

Rotated Factor Matrix		
	I.	II.
Rather be a citizen of respondent's country than other	0.487	
The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the (COUNTRY NATIONALITY)	0.776	
Generally speaking, (COUNTRY) is a better country than most other countries	0.652	
People should support their country even if wrong	0.573	
It is impossible for people who do not share (COUNTRY'S) customs and traditions to become fully (COUNTRY NATIONALITY)	0.497	
(COUNTRY) should follow own interests even if it leads to conflicts	0.464	
How proud is the respondent of (COUNTRY'S) political influence in the world		0.659
How proud is the respondent of (COUNTRY'S) armed forces		0.427
How proud is the respondent of (COUNTRY'S) history		0.367
How important is it to respect (COUNTRY's) political institutions and laws		
How proud is the respondent of (COUNTRY) of way democracy works		0.626
How proud is the respondent of (COUNTRY) of economic achievements		0.669
How proud is the respondent of (COUNTRY) of social and security system		0.570
How proud is the respondent of (COUNTRY) of science and technology achievements		0.489
How proud is the respondent of (COUNTRY) of achievements in arts		0.511
How proud is the respondent of (COUNTRY) of fair treatment of groups in society		0.465