

“Comparing Demand and Supply Indicators in the Measurement of Party Systems”

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DRAFT! DO NOT QUOTE!

The stabilization of party systems can be measured in a range of different ways. Conventionally scholars examine such indicators as electoral volatility, effective number of parties, the level of party nationalization, vote continuities across parties or vote shares for new parties. (Moser 1999; Jones and Mainwaring 2003; Caramani 2004; Tavits 2005; Mainwaring and Zoco 2007; Tavits 2007). These figures, however, are all demand-oriented in the sense that they reflect the different amounts of support voters give to parties during elections. Yet there is also clearly a supply side to the equation, meaning not only the number of parties registered for an election, but also their organizational form as well as organization cohesion. The study of party system stabilization should therefore focus equally on tracking *party organizational* developments to distinguish patterns within this antecedent stage to electoral competition. Voters are important for party system stabilization. But they can only choose among the choices that are offered to them by politicians and the latter’s prior organizational and affiliational choices. If these choices are volatile and erratic, then the electoral result will inevitably be the same. This can, in turn, affect the stability of subsequent government coalitions and ultimately the quality of democracy.

This paper will attempt to link these two dimensions of party system development in the case of the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Since this work is only at a preliminary stage, the focus will be on presenting mainly empirical data, comparing first ‘demand’ and then ‘supply’ figures for the three states. In the process, the paper will offer comparative analysis, not only for each country across time, but also cross-nationally. The analysis will show that Estonia’s party system is clearly more consolidated than in Latvia or Lithuania. However, precisely through a combination of demand- and supply-side indicators we will be able to see that Lithuania’s party system is not as deconsolidated as conventional measurements indicate.


CONVENTIONAL MEASURES: THE DEMAND SIDE

Most analyses of party system stabilization focus on demand-side indicators, since they reflect the fountain of electoral democracy—voter preferences—and are therefore a sign of potential political cleavages more deeply in society. Five indicators are particularly important: the effective number of electoral parties, the number of wasted votes per election, the effective number of parliamentary parties, the level of party nationalization, and the level of support for

new parties per election.¹ In this section we will briefly review all of these in the case of the Baltic states.


Figure 1 presents the effective number of electoral parties (N_v) for each election in the Baltic states since independence. (Note: data for Lithuania based on party-list voting only.) The trend show clearly that whereas Estonia's N_v has generally gone down, Lithuania's has risen sharply, while Latvia's has fluctuated somewhere in between. Voters in Estonia have increasingly concentrated their votes around 5-6 main parties, where Latvia and Lithuania have hovered about 8 or 9.

Figure 1: The effective number of electoral parties in the Baltic States



Equally indicative of trends in the consolidation of voting patterns is the number of ‘wasted votes’ during each election, or the percentage of votes cast for parties that do not get into parliament. While this figure is clearly influenced by the electoral system (or more precisely by the level of any official electoral threshold that is used to allocate seats), the lower this amount, the more voters can be said to be focused on electorally viable parties. For this indicator, Estonia again shows a clear consolidating trend, with Lithuania at the other extreme and Latvia in the middle.


Figure 2: % of ‘wasted votes’ in the Baltic States



¹ In conventional electoral studies scholars examine also electoral volatility. However, in the case of most post-communist party systems the fact that parties so often merge and split between elections means that it is impossible to calculate the relevant pairs of vote shares needed to compare between elections.

Combining both the fragmentation level of general electoral support (N_v) as well as the effects of electoral system thresholds (and other aggregation mechanisms), we have the effective number of parliamentary parties (N_s), which shows how many essential players end up in the legislature. This indicator is therefore slightly removed from pure electoral preferences (since preferences have been refracted by electoral law). At the same time it sets up the party-political landscape both for subsequent decision-making (government coalitions, etc) as well as the next electoral cycle. Within this indicator, we see a tighter distribution across the Baltic states, although still a more consolidating trend for Estonia and deconsolidation for Lithuania.


Figure 3: The effective number of parliamentary parties in the Baltic States



A fourth indicator of party system consolidation is the degree of party nationalization. The theoretical argument here is that the more parties demonstrate electoral strength across the entire spread of a country, the more robust is the party competition. This indicator therefore seeks to reveal deeper patterns of cleavage behind party support, and if these cleavages are particularly regional, then the party system is also seen as more divided. At the same time, these levels can well be influenced by the electoral system. Where an electoral system is more centralized in the sense that it is based on closed party lists and fewer electoral districts, the tendency toward nationalization is greater. Where the system allows for open lists or single-member districts, individual personalities (or stars) can distort a party's regional distribution. This nuance explains the variation we see across the Baltic states, where Latvia's closed party lists have helped it even out its parties' political support. Moreover, until 2009 candidates could run in more than one, if not in all five of the country's electoral districts. This meant that parties could use their most popular candidates to draw support in all of the electoral districts.² By contrast, the effect of Estonia's personalized list-PR system (where voters vote for single candidates, whose votes are then aggregated by party) is clearly shown during the early years, when many maverick or shooting-star politicians won large numbers of votes in their particular home district, but the party as a whole did less well in other areas. Slowly, parties have come to even out their leaderships as well as their support bases across the country. Lastly, Lithuania has remained for the most part higher than Estonia, but has also fluctuated because of the effect of having a dual electoral system of both multi-mandate list-PR and single-mandate first-past-the-post. Where voters end up particularly supporting a popular SMD candidate, they may also back the party's MMD list, thereby skewing the geographic distribution of votes.

² These effects also helped to counter some of the ethno-geographic cleavages in Latvia, where Russian-speakers are concentrated in Riga and the eastern district of Latgale, while Latvians are in rural areas and other, smaller cities.

Figure 4: Levels of party nationalization in the Baltic States



Note: Party nationalization score calculated as per Mainwaring and Zoco. PSNS is the combined total of nationalization scores for all parties taking part in the election, weighted by their final share of the vote.

During any election there is always the likelihood that new political parties will attempt their fortune at the ballot box. Moreover, the number of such new parties before an election is a key indicator of the supply side of the equation that we will examine shortly. However, equally essential is the degree to which voters embrace such newcomers and in so doing alter the political landscape. In stable democracies, new parties may emerge as marginal contenders, but rarely will they attract breakthrough support, i.e. more than single-digit percentages.

Among scholars, however, there is disagreement as to how to count new parties, that is, whether only entirely novel political formulations should be considered or whether fission parties (splinter groups that have broken off from existing parties) should be added. In the literature on Central and Eastern Europe, Sikk (2005) has taken the former approach, while Tavits (2007) has followed the latter. This paper will adopt a position tilting more toward the strict approach, since as Lucardie (2000) has shown new parties can have distinctly different programmatic or ideological orientations. Whereas fission parties are likely to be ‘purifiers’ of an ideological message, genuinely new parties will often be either prolocutors (expressing the interests of a neglected social group), prophets (espousing a wholly new ideology) or the personal political vehicle of a single charismatic leader. To be sure, all of these parties are ‘new’ for the voter, since they are encountering them for the first time. But because they may be supporting them for completely different reasons, it is worthwhile to distinguish them where possible.

Examining again the case of the Baltic states, we see that the electoral success of both brand-new and fission parties has been a frequent phenomenon and that none of the countries shows a clear consolidating trend. Table 1 reports the aggregate electoral strength of different party types, with fission and brand-new parties highlighted in grey together with those who were completely unchanged. While in Estonia and Latvia, the overall electoral share of unchanged parties has begun to reach 70% (meaning that voters are more and more tending toward well-known, organizationally stable parties), in Lithuania brand-new parties have repeatedly met with success and thus voters have proven relatively unstable in their preferences. Moreover, brand-new parties have generally been more successful than fission parties, suggesting that in programmatic-ideological terms voters are more receptive to prophetic, prolocutor or charismatic-personal appeals. In other words, when voters look for a new political force to try out, they tend to yearn for an entirely new savior on the party-political scene, rather than the purifying orientation of fission parties.


Table 1: Party types and electoral strength in the Baltic States, %

ESTONIA	1995	1999	2003	2007
Unchanged	2,33	57,02	58,71	74,97
Alliance	42,52	20,98	0	0
Merger	28,02	15,21	13,58	17,89
Post-Alliance	0	2,53	2,67	0,00
Fission	24,40	0,38	0	0
Brand-new	2,46	2,43	24,62	7,13
LATVIA	1995	1998	2002	2006
Unchanged	42,06	22,22	50,50	69,95
Alliance	17,74	29,22	10,00	10,66
Merger	15,15	17,12	9,50	0
Post-Alliance	7,04	0	0,50	0
Fission	14,90	0,05	1,50	14,42
Brand-new	2,65	30,83	27,60	4,33
LITHUANIA	1996	2000	2004	2008
Unchanged	64,85	43,29	21,68	37,09
Alliance	2,20	32,23	32,01	0
Merger	0	1,47	17,16	21,47
Post-Alliance	19,25	0,88	0	16,28
Fission	0	2,50	0,50	5,73
Brand-new	13,68	19,64	28,66	19,44

SUPPLY-SIDE INDICATORS

At its most basic, the supply of political contenders at an election can be examined by simply counting the number of parties contesting an election. In Figure 5 we see that whereas in Estonia this figure has gradually gone down over 5 elections (to just 11 in 2007), in Latvia and Lithuania it has remained close to 20. In the case of Lithuania, this is partly explained by the nature of the electoral system. Namely, many small parties decide to contest only a few single-member districts and do not participate in the multi-member district party-list vote. In this analysis, however, they are still counted, since they remain part of the political landscape.

Figure 5: Total number of parties participating in an election



Note: Lithuanian data include those parties, who only ran in single-member districts.

A more nuanced way of examining the stability of party organization patterns as a supply factor is to calculate the number of parties according to party type as done in Table 1. How many parties during a given election represent some kind of reconfigured or brand-new organizational form? Naturally, the question pertains most of all to unchanged vs. fission or start-up parties. But also party alliances and mergers are relevant, since they indicate that some level of organizational consolidation is still going on. Conversely, large numbers of parties who have left or broken up a previous alliance indicates that parties are deconsolidating.

Table 2: Proportion of political parties participating in an election according to party type

ESTONIA	1995	1999	2003	2007
Unchanged	13%	33%	55%	82%
Alliance	25%	25%	0%	0%
Merger	19%	8%	18%	9%
Post-Alliance	0%	17%	18%	0%
Fission	25%	8%	0%	0%
Brand-new	19%	8%	9%	9%
LATVIA	1995	1998	2002	2006
Unchanged	37%	29%	35%	42%
Alliance	21%	14%	15%	16%
Merger	5%	10%	5%	0%
Post-Alliance	11%	0%	5%	0%
Fission	5%	5%	5%	5%
Brand-new	21%	43%	35%	37%
LITHUANIA	1996	2000	2004	2008
Unchanged	38%	53%	47%	44%
Alliance	4%	13%	13%	0%
Merger	0%	7%	20%	13%
Post-Alliance	17%	7%	0%	19%
Fission	0%	13%	7%	6%
Brand-new	42%	7%	13%	19%


Table 2 mirrors the results of Table 1 in that for Estonia not only has voter support for brand-new parties declined, but also these parties' absolute numbers. Meanwhile, Latvia in particular has seen large numbers of brand-new parties contest each election (on average 7,5 or roughly 34% of all parties in an election), indicating that political activists continue to prefer starting up a new political formation, rather than joining existing political parties. There are two possible explanations for this, which in part are also mutually reinforcing. The first is that political entrepreneurs may see it as their best strategy to offer themselves either a prolocutor, prophetic or personalistic type of new party, because the electorate in these post-communist societies is constantly looking for a new political savior. It is in this sense more rational to build a political career via a new political party, rather than to apply one's talents in an existing one. Secondly, institutional rules can reinforce such predispositions if, for example, founding a new political party is easy. In Latvia, one needs only 200 people to form a new party, of whom half can also be non-citizen permanent residents.

A third important way of measuring the supply side of party politics is to cast the perspective in the inverse direction. That is, we can begin by examining what happened to a set of parties *after* an election and see in what proportions these parties changed their organizational forms in the years until the next election. The premise for such an analysis is that every election

represents a kind of benchmark in the evolution of a party system. Politicians have aligned themselves in a certain organizational manner, presented themselves to voters, and presumably expect to continue on in these forms after the poll is over. If during the subsequent years, large numbers of parties change their organizational form (i.e. they merge, create new alliances, break up previous alliances or undergo fissions), this indicates that politicians themselves are not consolidated in their organizational forms or inter-personal alignments. Politicians have not yet reached a stage where cooperation via stable and credible political formations becomes the norm.

In Figure 6 we see that following each election in the Baltic states an average of 34% of all parties have undergone some kind of organizational change, be it they formed an alliance or a merger with another party or they broke up an alliance that existed in the previous election. At the same, we notice that in Estonia these trends have declined considerably and that between 2003 and 2007 nine out of eleven parties contesting the 2003 poll ended up remaining unchanged for the 2007 one, and no parties disappeared. By contrast, in Latvia and Lithuania more than half of all parties have changed themselves in one form or another. Moreover, a high number of parties disappear after each election, indicating an important circulation of parties as new ones come in and others drop out. True, in consolidated democracies marginal parties come and go as well. But not necessarily in such proportions.

Figure 6: Proportion of political parties that underwent an organizational change following a given election



Lastly, we can add to this special ‘prospective’ view of party organizational change the element of electoral share gained during each particular election, thereby showing what I term the ‘previous electoral stake’ that is altered in the run-up to the next election. The premise here is that parties coming out of an election possess a certain amount of electoral capital based on the level of voter support that they achieved. If in the lead-up to the next election, a party decides to undergo an organizational change, then it has intrinsically decided to risk this existing level of support and offer itself as something different in time for the next election. If a party system were consolidated, we would see very little of the ‘previous electoral stake’ change, since even if the specific levels of electoral support for parties change (i.e. volatility), their combined total as ‘unchanged parties’ would remain high. By contrast, if the previous electoral stake changes considerably, parties would seem to be chronically unstable organizationally and carry much of their previous electorate into some kind of new organizational configuration.

Table 3: ‘Previous election stake’ that was changed by the time the next election took place

ESTONIA	1992	1995	1999	2003
Unchanged	1,8	38,6	75,6	75,0
Reconfigured	92,0	52,9	13,4	24,6
Disappeared	1,9	8,3	9,6	0,0
LATVIA	1993	1995	1998	2002
Unchanged	46,6	52,3	81,9	79,0
Reconfigured	49,9	44,3	15,4	16,2
Disappeared	3,5	3,0	2,2	4,4
LITHUANIA	1992	1996	2000	2004
Unchanged	83,6	64,2	16,4	60,5
Reconfigured	14,6	30,3	83,6	38,7
Disappeared	1,8	5,5	0,0	0,8

Example: for the 1992 Estonian election, parties that would remain unchanged in advance of the next election in 1995 received a total of 1,8%. Parties that would be reconfigured by the 1995 election constitute 92% of voter support in 1992. Parties that would disappear within 3 years received just 1,9%.

The data in Table 3 indicate a slightly better picture for Latvia and Lithuania in that although individual parties continue to change organizationally and new parties abound, roughly two-thirds of the electorate coming out of an election can expect to have the party they voted for remain unchanged in time for the next election. In Estonia, this figure is slightly higher at 75%.

The third dimension of party supply relates to levels of cohesion within political parties. Even if parties do not undergo organizational change, they may still be unstable internally with leaders and members alternating between elections. Party switching has become an increasingly important topic examined by scholars working on both established and new democracies. (Shabad and Slomczynski 2004; Heller and Mershon 2009) While most existing studies focus on party switching among MPs, this paper will go deeper by looking at electoral candidates. At the same time, we will also differentiate between incumbents and non-incumbents. Drawing on a database of all candidates for the national parliament in all three Baltic states since 1992, we can examine the patterns of party affiliation among those candidates who have run in two successive elections. We will call these ‘repeat candidates’.

The first question to ask is to what extent repeat candidates were *loyal* to their previous political party when they decided to run again for parliament. The higher the rate of loyalty, the higher the level of cohesion in the party system. However, at a second glance this characteristic is not so easy to determine if the candidate’s party during the first election has since undergone an organizational change; for example, it merged with some other party or entered an electoral alliance. Likewise, disloyalty is a more complex category, since candidates could move either to another established party, a merged party, an electoral alliance, a fission party or a brand-new party. For analytical purposes, some of the categories can be collapsed. At the same time, very detailed coding such as the system described can be extremely useful to detect flows of candidates to specific party formations. Moreover, it is the streams of individuals from one party to another that makes up organizational change. It is therefore not always sufficient to simply count the number of different parties. Rather, where possible one should map out the changing constellations of political elites between political parties.

In Table 4 we can observe that levels of party loyalty among repeat candidates have been steadily rising above 80% in Estonia and Lithuania, while in Latvia they have been steady at

around 70%. At the same time it is notable that brand-new parties in Latvia draw a considerable number of repeat candidates, where as in Estonia and Lithuania this number is negligible. In other words, when new parties start up in Estonia or Lithuania they seem to rely on entirely new candidates. They recruit or draw people, who previously had never taken part in politics. In this respect, they appear to resemble truly new parties. By contrast, in Latvia new parties seem to be formed with a notable eye to drawing candidates from other parties. They are not as much aimed at mobilizing new participants in the political process so much as re-grouping political elites under new labels.

Table 4: Levels of loyalty among repeat candidates, %

ESTONIA	1992-1995	1995-1999	1999-2003	2003-2007
Loyal	58,80	75,00	80,10	88,70
Switched to single party	1,50	16,40	14,70	9,40
Switched to alliance or fusion	15,70	5,00	1,70	0,80
Fission	21,20	2,60	0,70	0,00
Start-up	2,90	1,00	2,70	1,10
LATVIA	1993-1995	1995-1998	1998-2002	2002-2006
Loyal	71,00	67,90	74,40	67,60
Switched to single party	7,30	6,00	6,10	5,80
Switched to alliance or fusion	12,60	9,60	3,80	6,10
Fission	4,20	0,70	5,50	8,90
Start-up	5,00	15,90	10,20	11,60
LITHUANIA	1992-1996	1996-2000	2000-2004	2004-2008
Loyal	69,00	68,60	80,50	81,80
Switched to single party	18,00	10,10	4,00	10,00
Switched to alliance or fusion	3,10	4,40	9,50	1,00
Fission	1,90	13,40	4,20	4,70
Start-up	8,00	3,60	1,70	2,50

Yet most of all this pertains to non-incumbent repeat candidates, as indicated in Table 5 (see Appendix). In the case of Latvia, there is a clear group of politically interested people, who enter politics with one party, fail to be elected, and then search for an alternative party to join. Moreover, nearly two-thirds of the time such non-incumbents gravitate to either fission or brand-new parties instead of to existing parties or mergers. It would appear Latvia has a large contingent of politicians who nomadically travel between political formations. As noted above, this is clearly influenced by the fact that parties are easy to found in Latvia. But also, party organization itself appears to be underdeveloped, failing to build real loyalty and cohesion among members.

As might well be expected, MPs running for re-election show far higher levels of loyalty in all three countries. Moreover, when they switch it is rarely to start-up parties. Nonetheless, MPs party switching patterns can vary. At times they may spearhead the creation of fission parties (as in Latvia between 2002 and 2006 or Lithuania between 1996 and 2000). Other times they may be lured by other established parties or newly merged parties, which offer them a better electoral position.³ Such appears to have been the case in Lithuania in 2008, when nearly 17% of MPs running for re-election switched to other pre-existing parties.

³ It is important to note that the category of 'loyal' includes those repeat candidates, whose party was part of a merger between elections. If a candidate went along with the merger and ran again in the new formation, he/she is considered loyal. Candidates classified as having 'switched to a merger' concern those, who left their old party for a separate, newly merged party.

Finally, one can use repeat candidate data to look at the degree to which political elites are linked to single parties and are not involved in mergers or alliances. The argument here is that in a consolidated party system politicians no longer obscure their electoral image via joint lists, alliances or *apparentements*. Nor are they involved in recently merged parties, which are still in the process of stabilizing themselves. The more repeat candidates are members of single parties (even if they switch between such parties), the more consolidated the party system as a whole.

Table 6: Repeat candidates by type of party they ran in during second election, %

ESTONIA	1992-1995	1995-1999	1999-2003	2003-2007
Single	7,3	53,1	85,1	77,7
Apparentement	28,8	23,1	0,0	0,0
Fusion	39,8	20,2	11,4	21,2
Fission	21,2	2,6	0,7	0,0
Startup	2,9	1,0	2,7	1,1
LATVIA	1993-1995	1995-1998	1998-2002	2002-2006
Single	46,2	33,4	63,5	45,1
Apparentement	37,0	25,2	15,4	34,5
Fusion	7,6	24,8	5,5	0,0
Fission	4,2	0,7	5,5	8,9
Startup	5,0	15,9	10,2	11,6
LITHUANIA	1992-1996	1996-2000	2000-2004	2004-2008
Single	81,2	56,3	22,9	76,1
Apparentement	8,8	24,9	28,9	0,0
Fusion	0,0	1,9	42,1	16,7
Fission	1,9	13,4	4,2	4,7
Startup	8,0	3,6	1,7	2,5

Table 6 reveals once again that while Estonia leads, Lithuania is not as deconsolidated as conventional indicators would imply. After having suffered major disruptions during the periods 1996-2000 and 2000-2004, the latest election in 2008 saw three-quarters of all repeat candidates involved with established, single-parties. By contrast, Latvia continued to be awash with loose alliances, fission parties and start-ups. As concerns incumbent versus non-incumbent repeat candidates, the differences across this indicator were negligible.

CONCLUSION

This paper has sought to argue that party system development in new democracies needs to be examined across both demand- and supply-side indicators. The data presented here from the Baltic states demonstrate that if we take only demand-side indicators, we may fail to see certain other processes going on. To be sure, in the case of Estonia the data from both sides of the party system tend to corroborate the fact that the northern-most Baltic state is well on its way to consolidating its party system. Not only are voters coalescing around certain stable political parties, but the politicians themselves are increasingly lining up in distinctive and enduring ways.

Meanwhile, in the case of Latvia and Lithuania the demand-side indicators seemed to show that both countries were equally unstable. Latvia, of course, has since the very beginning suffered from shifting electoral alliances, brand-new parties and a number of fission parties. However,

Lithuania has gone through a literal process of deconsolidation following a promising start in the early 1990s, when two large parties, Sajudis and the Democratic Labor Party, dominated the scene. As scholars have pointed out (Jurkynas 2004), part of this decline came from the erosion of the first major cleavage in Lithuanian politics, that between ex-communists and nationalists. However, whereas the demand-side indicators showed that party system instability continued beyond 2004, the supply-side data hint at a certain underlying constancy in terms of how core politicians are behaving. For example, while brand-new parties have scored well during Lithuanian elections, they have not succeeded in luring away large numbers of repeat candidates. In this respect, established Lithuanian parties appear to be holding their own organizationally against newcomers. Indeed, one could say that the pie of political participation is expanding in Lithuania (with new people becoming involved in the political process via start-up parties) as opposed to it remaining largely the same in Latvia, but merely being divvied up in a different way.

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Table 5: Loyalty among repeat candidates between parliamentary elections, broken down by incumbency

ESTONIA	92-95			95-99			99-03			03-07		
	All	MP	non-MP	All	MP	non-MP	All	MP	non-MP	All	MP	non-MP
Loyal	58,8%	60,8%	57,6%	75,0%	89,6%	70,9%	80,1%	93,9%	75,7%	88,7%	88,0%	89,0%
Switched to single party	1,5%	0,0%	2,3%	16,4%	6,3%	19,6%	14,7%	5,1%	17,8%	9,4%	12,0%	8,2%
Switched to alliance or fusion	15,7%	9,3%	19,2%	5,0%	2,1%	5,5%	1,7%	1,0%	2,0%	0,8%	0,0%	1,2%
Fission	21,2%	29,9%	16,4%	2,6%	2,1%	2,8%	0,7%	0,0%	1,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%
Start-up	2,9%	0,0%	4,5%	1,0%	0,0%	1,2%	2,7%	0,0%	3,6%	1,1%	0,0%	1,6%
LATVIA	93-95			95-98			98-02			02-06		
	All	MP	non-MP	All	MP	non-MP	All	MP	non-MP	All	MP	non-MP
Loyal	71,0%	87,3%	63,5%	67,9%	69,7%	67,0%	74,4%	89,1%	65,6%	67,6%	77,1%	61,1%
Switched to single party	7,3%	2,5%	9,4%	6,0%	9,0%	7,1%	6,1%	3,6%	7,1%	5,8%	1,0%	8,4%
Switched to alliance or fusion	12,6%	6,3%	15,5%	9,6%	11,2%	7,5%	3,8%	2,7%	4,9%	6,1%	8,3%	5,3%
Fission	4,2%	3,8%	4,4%	0,7%	0,0%	0,9%	5,5%	4,5%	6,0%	8,9%	12,5%	7,9%
Start-up	5,0%	0,0%	7,2%	15,9%	10,1%	17,5%	10,2%	0,0%	16,4%	11,6%	1,0%	17,4%
LITHUANIA	92-96			96-00			00-04			04-08		
	All	MP	non-MP	All	MP	non-MP	All	MP	non-MP	All	MP	non-MP
Loyal	69,0%	81,4%	60,0%	68,6%	74,1%	66,8%	80,5%	78,5%	79,7%	81,8%	73,3%	85,1%
Switched to single party	18,0%	12,7%	21,9%	10,1%	4,3%	12,4%	4,0%	3,1%	6,3%	10,0%	16,8%	7,4%
Switched to alliance or fusion	3,1%	0,0%	5,2%	4,4%	0,9%	6,0%	9,5%	10,0%	9,6%	1,0%	0,0%	1,1%
Fission	1,9%	2,0%	1,9%	13,4%	19,8%	10,0%	4,2%	6,2%	3,3%	4,7%	7,6%	3,7%
Start-up	8,0%	3,9%	11,0%	3,6%	0,9%	4,8%	1,7%	2,3%	1,1%	2,5%	2,3%	2,7%