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Representation and Political Culture in Germany after 1990

The Elite-Population-Relation and their Impact on the Evaluation of the Political System

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Abstract

This paper makes a contribution to the research on the still existing gap between Eastern and Western Germany in terms of their political cultures. We will argue that the process of transition should be analyzed as interaction between political elites and population. The argument is that the political elites in Eastern Germany adapted faster to the institutional framework imported from Western Germany than the population. This rapid adaptation caused a different understanding of the institutionally defined procedures of the political system - and even of some policies - among elites and the population in Eastern Germany – but also in Western Germany. This incongruence and representational gap leads to dissatisfaction with the political system.

Introduction

Almost 20 years after the re-unification, East and West Germans still differ in their evaluations of the political system and in their political cultures in general. Thereby political culture is understood in the tradition of Almond/Verba as the distribution of attitudes towards the political system and the political community (Almond und Verba 1989). For instance, citizens in Eastern Germany show lower levels of trust in actors and institutions of the political system (Gabriel und Schöllhammer 2009; Niedermayer 2009) and report less satisfaction with the performance of the system (Trüdinger 2005). The research that has been conducted on the causes and consequences of the East-West gap is voluminous, since the differences in the political culture appeared already a few years after the re-unification (for an overview: Gabriel 2005).

There was an implicit normative expectation in this research initially: the political culture in Eastern Germany will converge to the one in Western Germany. Many approaches have been put forward to explain the gap between Eastern and Western Germany. They can roughly be distinguished into socialization- and situation-related approaches. The former approaches focus on the effects of socialization in competing social and political systems, and claim that the differences will only disappear with generational change. The latter approaches focus primarily on socio-economic differences and claim that the differences in the political culture will disappear once Eastern Germany has the same economic performance, the same unemployment rate etc. as Western Germany. Empirical evidence has been found for both hypotheses and some differences still have not disappeared, which stimulated the formulation of integrated models.

Those models try to combine both effects and refute the expectation of a linear convergence of Eastern Germany to the standards of Western Germany. For example, the Challenge-Response approach conceptualizes the transition process as non-teleological and non-linear sequence of collective and elite driven responses to occurring challenges. Those responses consist of institutional arrangements that – once established – can produce new challenges (challenges of 2nd order) due to their self-enforcing and persistent character (Best 2007). One important insight of this approach is the pronunciation of the active role of political elites and their interaction with the population for the outcome of transition.

Everyday political processes, but also transition processes are characterized by an interaction of the population and its *elites*. Elites collect, aggregate, and integrate the heterogeneous interest of social groups in order to represent them. This representation is not a mirroring process: the interests that should be represented emerge out of an interaction between political leadership exerted by the elites and the elites' responsiveness towards the articulated demands of the population. Moreover, the elites need to establish themselves actively until their social group perceives them as legitimate representatives. But the process of representation comprises also the enforcement of these interests in the political process. Thus, the elites try to place these interests on the political agenda and bargain with other elites in order to accomplish the demands of their respective social group. Afterwards, the elites have to convince their social group that the outcome of the political process represents well the interests of the social group.

The representational process does not occur within a pre-stabilized harmony, since the interests of the different social groups are in conflict with each other, while at the same time there may be conflicts about the definition of the common interests between elites and their social group. Yet, a certain level of conflict or incongruence between elites and their social groups and between the different elites does not threaten the stability of the social system. As long as some pre-conditions are met,

successful conflict solution is possible. Those conditions comprise for instance a mutual acceptance of the different partners involved in the processes of representation and bargaining, a consensus on the basic rules and/or the support for common institutions that constitute the space for the negotiation of political conflict. If those conditions are met at the elite level, one can speak of successful horizontal integration, if they are met in the relation between elites and their social group, one can speak of successful vertical integration (Hofmann-Lange 1992).

Furthermore, one should distinguish between two dimensions of integration: on the one hand the attitudes towards the basic procedures and institutions of conflict solution and on the other hand the content of politics, the concrete interests, and policies that are object of the political process. If there is agreement about the procedures *and* the content, the integration is consummate, if there is neither agreement on procedures nor on the content, the integration has totally failed. Stable political systems normally display a huge consensus about the procedures and a lot of conflict about the content of politics both on the vertical and on the horizontal dimension.

It becomes obvious after this sketch that the process of transition cannot be properly understood, if the contribution of the political elites in both parts of the country is ignored. The integration of Eastern Germany can be considered as a learning process of democracy under the sometimes adverse conditions of transition. Unlike in all other CEE-countries, the institutional setting was not established from scratch, but was imported from Western Germany, while the political elite of the GDR was overwhelmingly replaced (Derlien 1997). Thus, the situation for the new political elite and the population in Eastern Germany was identical at the beginning of the 1990s: both had to learn and develop new attitudes and strategies of behaviour in order to cope successfully with the new institutional environment and with the procedures it provides. Further, for elite and population, the institutional learning occurred in front of the background of the socialization within the completely different institutional framework of the former GDR, which demanded partly contradictory attitudes and behaviour. However, it was more important for the political elite than for the population to understand the *modus operandi* of the political system, in order to gain political influence. At the same time the elites are more intensively and regularly involved in the political system than the population. In consequence, the political elite from Eastern Germany became more familiar with the political system than the population, whose participation is overwhelmingly constrained to the role of spectators or at the utmost to that of temporary activists.

The challenge of the complete de-legitimation of the institutional setting and the political elites in Eastern Germany was responded by the import of the institutional setting from Western Germany and by the adaptation of the Eastern elite to the western standards. Thus, our hypothesis is that the integration of the Eastern elite in the political system was more successful than the integration of the Eastern population. This difference should be indicated by both a high level of horizontal integration between Eastern and Western elite and a low level of vertical integration between Eastern elite and Eastern population. Since the population in Eastern Germany has not learned the institutionally defined procedures that guide politics, they do not comprehend the way their elites proceed in politics. In contrast, the elites support the institutionally defined procedures and perceive them as "normal", since they have learned how to cope with them. This incongruence or even misunderstanding has led to dissatisfaction among the population, since the population does not link politics and the procedures guiding them with their own political interests. This dissatisfaction is enforced, if nobody in the political elite represents the conceptions of the population. The adaptation of the Eastern elite towards the western standards as response the challenge of re-unification therefore caused a lack of vertical integration as challenge 2nd order.

Therefore, it is not sufficient to analyze solely the attitudes of the population, since incongruence between elite and population is a possible determinant of the dissatisfaction with the political system. Citizens with certain policy positions or understandings of democracy will be satisfied, if they perceive that their positions are represented by the elite in the political process. Thereby the institutionally defined procedures of politics are of special importance: they have direct impact on the (perceivable) behaviour of the political elite, which makes them more visible for the perception of the population, rather than abstract concepts like “democracy”, “performance of democracy”, “institutions” or principles of democracy like “freedom of speech”. Thus, institutionally defined procedures are a distinct object of political support, which complements the well-known compilation of political community, political regime, institutions (as a whole), politicians etc. (Easton 1975; Dalton 2004).

There is empirical evidence since the mid of the 1990s of an well established horizontal integration between Eastern and Western political elites (Kaina 1997; 2000). This is especially true for the institutionally defined procedures (Edinger und Vogel 2005). Unfortunately, there are only a few articles on the understanding of the institutionally defined procedures of the political system among the population. Although the work of Patzelt (Patzelt 1998) demonstrates huge differences between elites and population in the perceptions of parliamentarism, he neither provides empirical evidence of an impact of (mis-)perception on the evaluation and satisfaction with the political system nor does he distinguish between Eastern and Western Germany.

Furthermore, it is possible that the different degree of involvement of elites and population in the political system is not only responsible for an elite-population gap in the perception of institutionally defined procedures. The different involvement may also be influential on the second dimension of horizontal and vertical integration: the content of politics. The successful integration of the elite members from Eastern Germany, their intense interaction with elite members from Western Germany, or the increasingly similar recruitment patterns (Jahr 2008) may also have led to shared problem-perceptions and political attitudes among the elite - despite of still prevailing inter-party-differences. Especially political attitudes, which are shaped by the socialization, or which are of special importance for the situation in Eastern Germany, may cause dissatisfaction with democracy among the population, if there is a representational gap.

If there is a lack of representation of Eastern German attitudes and demands in the political elite, this vacancy can be occupied by a part(y) of the elite, which claims to represent the interests and demands of Eastern Germany. There should be a high degree of vertical integration between this party and the Eastern German population, but at the same time a lower degree of horizontal integration of this party to the remaining part of the political elite. The successor of the communist party PDS/The Left has been perceived to represent the interest of Eastern Germany. This claim was supported by the fact that this party was only present in Eastern Germany until 2007. Thus, the special role of the PDS/The Left is considered throughout the article.¹

Although the conditions for a lack of vertical integration – the different degree of involvement – may be given in Western Germany too, there are some reasons to assume that the gap is less pronounced than in Eastern Germany. In Western Germany, both elite and population had more time to make experiences with the new system. After 1945, *both* elites and population established the new political system, which took place under the conditions of a complete de-legitimation of the former politi-

¹ In this context a potential critique has to be met: why do we compare the whole elite with the whole population since the political competition is first of all between parties? The answer would be: If we include all parties and the parties do represent their electorates adequately - i.e. they have the same distribution of attitudes like their electorate - the whole elite should display congruence with the population too.

cal regime, positive economic circumstances, the communist regime as threat and negative evaluated alternative. Therefore, general positive evaluations of other dimensions of democracy might have had a positive spill-over that helped to accept the institutionally defined procedures. In contrast, after 1990 the institutional framework of Western Germany was almost unanimously accepted and population from Eastern Germany were expected to arrange themselves within this framework, which may have led to a feeling of heteronomy. Further, this adaptation took place under the conditions of an *incomplete* de-legitimation of the political system of the GDR and adverse economic circumstances, which have impeded the acceptance of the institutionally defined procedures.

Data Description

The question of our study on the relation between vertical and horizontal integration demands a research design that allows us to compare the political elite and the general population. These conditions are met by two surveys, which were carried out at the Collaborative Research Centre 580: on the one hand the German Parliamentarians' Survey (GPS) that now comprises three panel-waves, the first in 2003/2004, the second in 2007 and the third in 2010, and a population survey, which was conducted in 2009/10. The GPS targets the members of the German Bundestag, of State Parliaments (10 in the 1st wave, 13 in the 2nd and 16 in the 3rd wave) and the German members of the European Parliament. The sample coverage of the first wave is 56 %, while it amounts 56.4% in the second wave. We are just referring to the second wave, so that we have a sample population of 1223 active parliamentarians, who were conducted by Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing. Huge parts of the elite-questionnaire were repeated in the population survey, which comprises app. 2000 citizens, whereby half of them are from Eastern and half of them are from the Western Germany.

Analysis of the East-West and the Elite-Population Gap

In order to analyse the degree of horizontal and vertical integration and its impact on the evaluation of the political system, we distinguished between three sorts of variables:

1. The satisfaction with the performance of the democracy serves as dependent variable and is measured, both in elite and population, by the question: "All things considered, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with democracy as it is practiced in Germany? Are you very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?"
2. The institutionally defined procedures are measured by the following item and questions:
 - Demand for coherent voting behaviour: „A Member of Parliament should vote with his/her party on important issues, even if he/she has a different opinion.“ (Population: same wording)
 - Focus of Representation: „As a Member of Parliament, do you perceive yourself first and foremost as a representative of your party, of your voters, of your electoral district or of the entire country?“ (Population: "In your opinion, whom should MPs represent first and foremost; the own party, the own voters, their electoral district or the entire country?")
 - The priority of Leadership or Responsiveness: „As a Member of Parliament, one must perform various duties. In your view, is it generally more important to provide citizens with political direction? Or is it more important primarily to act on the suggestions and proposals that come from citizens?“ (Population: Members of Parliament)

perform various duties. In your opinion, is it generally more important for an MP to provide citizens with political direction? Or is it more important primarily to act on the suggestions and proposals that come from citizens?")

3. Policies are measured by the following question and item:

- State-Interventionism: "The creation and maintenance of jobs is first and foremost a task of the government." (Population: same wording)
- Policy-Trilemma: "Restructuring state finances, creating economic growth and reducing social inequality are all important political goals. If you had to rank these goals, which would you say is most important: reducing social inequality, creating economic growth or restructuring state finances?" (Population: same wording)
- Demand for East-West-Policies: "Even today, the eastern German states cannot be dealt with according to the same standards as the western German states." (Population: same wording)
- Individualizing social security: "The state should place more responsibility for social security in the hands of individual citizens." (Population: same wording)

If we start with the dependent variable (Graph 4), the satisfaction about democracy, the aforementioned finding of a gap in the political culture of Eastern and Western Germany is repeated. While more than the half of the population in Eastern Germany is dissatisfied with the democracy in Germany, this is only true for 38 percent of the population in Western Germany. Additionally to this difference we find an elite-population gap in both parts of the country. The elites in Eastern and in Western Germany are more satisfied with the democracy than the population. However, the East-West gap is also dividing the political elite, whereby the elites in Eastern Germany appear as less satisfied. In this respect, the Eastern German elite is even closer to the population in Western Germany than to the population in Eastern Germany.

(Graph 4: Satisfaction with the performance of democracy)

(Graph 5: Satisfaction with the performance of democracy – controlled for MPs of Post-Communists)

Almost all incongruence between Eastern and Western elites is due to the MPs of the Post-Communists, which are the most dissatisfied part of the elite. If we analyze them separately, the difference between Eastern and Western elites diminishes significantly, while the difference between the Eastern elite and their population increases dramatically. In terms of satisfaction with democracy, the horizontal integration of the elite was successful with the prominent exception of the Post-Communists. In contrast, in both parts of the country the political elites are much more satisfied with democracy than the population even if this difference is smaller in Western Germany.

Both the degree of experience with and the involvement in the political system seems to increase the satisfaction about it, since elite and population in Western Germany have gained more experience with the political system whereas the elite is more involved into the political system.² In this respect, the Post-Communists represent the dissatisfaction of the Eastern German population. However, it remains uncertain, if the dissatisfaction among the Post-Communists *means* the same as the dissatisfaction within the population. While the dissatisfaction of the Post-Communists may be determined

² Although not reported here, we are able to show, that the social-demographic differences between population and elite in terms of age, education and gender are not sufficient to explain the difference. There is a genuine effect of elite status.

by their still not completely legitimate status within the German elite,³ the population may be dissatisfied due to perceived shortcomings of the political outcome, a possible lack of representation or their different understanding of the institutionally defined procedures of politics.

In order to analyze those procedures, we start with the demand for coherent voting behaviour. The political system in Germany at federal and single-state level is characterized as parliamentary government, in which the government governs together with their related parliamentary party groups (PPG's). Since the government is based on the support of its parties in parliament, coherent voting behaviour is needed when it comes to cast the ballots. Thus, the demand for coherent voting behaviour is considered to be determined by the institutional framework.

(Graph 6: Demand for coherent voting behaviour)

(Graph 7: Demand for coherent voting behaviour – controlled for Post-Communists)

While an extensive agreement (74 percent) on the necessity of party unity in plenary vote is expressed among the Western elite, the Eastern elite is significantly more cautious. Yet, still a majority of 55 percent of them calls for party unity. This East-West gap among the population is dramatically smaller. In contrary, the citizens in Eastern and Western Germany agree in their refusal of party unity, if an MP's opinion differs from that of his or her PPG. Furthermore, the population in Western Germany refute party unity a bit more emphatic. A separate analysis for the MPs of the Post-Communists reveals again that most of the difference between Eastern and Western elite is due to the Post-Communists, who represent the population of whole Germany in their refusal of party unity in plenary votes.

Although we see a significant minority among the political elite who refutes one of the basic institutionally defined features of the political system, this is often due to their oppositional status. In opposition, party unity is not necessary for the survival of the government. A deeper analysis clarifies that even the huge amount of refusal among the Post-Communists seems to be grounded in their situation as oppositional party in almost all of the legislatures: in the state legislature of Berlin, wherein the Post Communists are part of the government, their call for party unity amounts 78 percent as well. In contrast, the rejection of party unity among the population may be caused by different reasons, for instance a rejection of the role of political parties and an overemphasis of the single deputy. Since in parliamentary government, political objectives can only be achieved by parties acting homogeneous, MPs understand party unity as necessary condition for political influence. Even MPs voting sometime against their own opinion can rely on the solidarity of their colleagues in forthcoming plenary votes. In contrast, the population understands such solidarity as forced, and therefore constraining free deputies. Moreover, they perceive MPs who vote against their own opinion as dishonestly and spineless.

The rejection of the influence of political parties and the emphasis on the judgement of the single deputy can be traced back to the discussion of the *trustee* and *delegate* concept, first mentioned by Edmund Burke in his famous speech to the electors in Bristol. According to this distinction, MPs voting with their own party although they have different opinions appear as delegates of their party. Yet, a rejection of party unity means not necessarily a rejection of the delegate concept as well. Instead, it is conceivable that the population demands not the party but a different principal to instruct

³ At the time the elite survey was conducted, the Post-Communists were only present in the government of the single-state of Berlin, in 2009 the designated government of Andrea Ypsilanti broke up (officially) due to the question of entering a coalition with the Post-Communists and during the election campaigns in 2009 the presumable coalition partner of the Post-Communists, the Social Democrats, tried to avoid the discussion on possible coalitions and even excluded this possibility at federal level.

the delegate. The question of who is instructing the delegate, or – to put it differently – *whom* to represent, refers to the focus of representation, whereby the differentiation between *trustee* and *delegate* concerns the style of representation resp. the question of *how* to represent. Although these two dimensions are analytically different, focus and style of representation are not unrelated (Eulau et al. 1959). Thus, if we look at the focus of representation, we can also distinguish between trustee and delegate. There are two foci of representation, the entire country and the electoral district, which can be described as universalistic foci, since they exceed the exclusive representation of one's political supporters and include also the non-supporters. Therefore, a simple articulation of the interests of those two foci is not possible, since contradicting demands have to be integrated. Such integration is only possible, if MPs understand themselves as trustees. In contrast, for the two particularistic foci, own voters and own party, which comprise solely the political supporters, the identification and representation of interests is alleviated, since the latter are rather homogeneous.

(Graph 8: Demanded Focus of Representation)

(Graph 9: Demanded Focus of Representation – controlled for MPs of Post-Communists)

A relative majority of Eastern and Western elites claim to represent the entire country as first priority, whereby representing the electoral district is chosen by at least one fourth of the elites in Eastern and Western Germany. This amount increases among the elites in Eastern Germany, if the Post-Communists are analyzed separately. The most impressive difference between elite and population is the increased amount among the population who demand the MPs to represent first and foremost the own voters. In this respect, the Post-Communists are comparable to the population but they differ from both elite and population in their huge amount of MPs claiming to represent their party as first priority. It seems that the delegate concept is still prominent among the population although MPs are not considered to be delegates of their party but of their own voters – especially in Eastern Germany. In MPs' daily life in parliament, the necessity of "le compromise de tous les jours" (Fraenkel 1979) is experienced constantly, which enforces an universalistic focus and impedes the representation of particular interests. From the point of view of the population, the representation of interests – esp. of the own voters – is more important than the integration of interest, because citizens are normally not in the dilemma to integrate different and sometimes contradicting political interest in order to exert public policies.

Closely connected to the universalistic focus is the emphasis on the leadership task of MPs, since the integration of interests is not possible by just articulating them, but only by providing and implementing proposals for compromise, hence by political leadership. Confronted with the decision between responsiveness and leadership, a relative majority of MPs in Eastern and Western Germany describes both aspects as inextricably connected within their daily work. The elites in Western Germany emphasize their leadership task slightly stronger, but in contrast to the population, the differences between Eastern and Western elites are rather marginal. In both parts of the country the population requests MPs to give priority to the accumulation and articulation of citizens' suggestions and nearly denies the importance of political leadership.⁴ The difference between Eastern and Western elite diminishes even more, if we analyze the Post-Communists separately. Yet, in their approval for the integration of leadership and responsiveness they are not representing the population, even though they are closer to the population in their emphasis on responsiveness. In this respect the

⁴ One has to mention that the answer-category „both equally important“ was not offered during the interview, neither for the MPs nor for the population. Therefore, the population was maybe not courageous enough to opt for this category while the social status of the MPs allowed them to defy the categories suggested by the interviewer.


Post-Communists are in an equidistance to elite and population, which seems to be a concession to their parliamentary involvement. The parliamentary context with its necessity of compromise constrains the exclusive focus on the articulation of particular interests and thus causes a distance to the population, since the population focuses rather on representation instead of integration.

(Graph 10: Decision between Leadership and Responsiveness)

(Graph 11: Decision between Leadership and Responsiveness – controlled for Post Communists)

After these separate analyses, we want to analyse the institutionally defined procedures plus the evaluation of democracy conjointly. Therefore, we use *Correspondence Analysis* in order to explore and display graphically a combined contingency table and to observe whether two dimensions “Elite-Population” and “East-West” could be extracted. *Correspondence Analysis* visualizes similarities and dissimilarities of rows and columns of a contingency table in a low-as-possible dimensional space. In the following, the so called column- and row-profiles are represented by points in a two-dimensional space. Similarity and Dissimilarity is displayed by closeness and distance of the points but one can only interpret the positions of row- and column profiles separately. At the same time, all variables can be analysed in their contribution to the extracted dimensions, e.g. which variables discriminate the groups the most. The measurement of the relative weight of the variables is their contribution to the total inertia of the dimension, comparable to the commonalities in *Principal-Component-Analysis*, whereas the contribution of the dimensions to the total inertia of the table finds its analogy in the eigenvalue. The inertia is a measurement for the dispersion of the data and is calculated basing on Chi-Square (Greenacre 1984). Graphically, a huge contribution of a row or column to a dimension is expressed by a position close to the poles of this dimension. The rows and columns – which represent variables – close to the poles of the dimension help to interpret the meaning of the dimensions.

Graph 1: Correspondence Analysis for Institutionally Defined Procedures



(For details see: Table 2Table 2 in the Appendix)

A first look at the inertia of the two dimensions reveals that the first dimension (=vertical dimension) comprises 89 percent of the total Inertia and the second dimension 9 percent, which alleviates the interpretation of a two-dimensional solution (Table 2).

The first dimension (=vertical dimension) can clearly be interpreted as “Elite-Population” dimension, since graphically the poles of this dimension are determined by the population in Eastern Germany and the elite from Western Germany. The contribution of the Western elite on the inertia of this dimension amounts to 51 percent, which makes it the most important determinant. The contributions of the institutionally defined procedures on the inertia of the first dimension reveals that dissatisfaction with democracy, priority of responsiveness, leadership and balance between them as well as the approval of party unity are the aspects that dominate this dimension, which is graphically expressed by their position near to the bottom resp. top of the first dimension.

The second dimension is dominated by the Post-Communists and again by the dissatisfaction with democracy but also by the representation of one’s own party, the call for a balance between leadership and responsiveness, the emphasis on responsiveness and the satisfaction with democracy. However, the description of this dimension as East-West dimension is appropriate only in the sense that the Post-Communists are representing the dissatisfaction with democracy among the Eastern population by appearing even as even more dissatisfied than the latter. Actually, the second dimension is rather described as Post-Communist dimension with their pronounced demand for balance between leadership and responsiveness and their emphasis on the representation of one’s own party.

The most important result of the *Correspondence Analysis* is the graphical representation and thus clarification of the elite-population gap. In comparison to the East-West differences among the elite and among the population, the elite-population gap appears by far more important. Further, the elite in both parts of Germany appears somewhat better integrated than the population in terms of the institutionally defined procedures. Yet, this statement is only valid, if we exclude the Post-Communists. To a certain extent they are close to the population in their denial of party unity, their emphasis on responsiveness and representation of the voters and in their dissatisfaction with democracy. But at the same time they are not only distinct from the other elite members but they are also distinct from the population. Their emphasis on the balance between leadership and responsiveness seems to be a concession to the parliamentary procedures, wherein they are involved. On the other hand, the accentuation of representing one’s own party can be grounded in a certain self-image: their party represents “the interests” of Eastern Germany or – more specific – the interests of the former GDR-citizens, who lack representation in the other parties. Yet, the conclusion from this self-image, i.e. the representation of one’s own party is of priority for the MPs, finds no counterpart in the population. Nevertheless, the MPs from the Post-Communists are closer to the population in their understanding of the institutionally defined procedures as to the remaining elite members.

In contrast to the previous ones the following sections focus on policies with a link to the history or the current developments in Eastern and Western Germany. The first aspect of policies deals with the weighting of governmental task and their saliency in politics: should the state first of all downsize social inequality, enhance the economic growth or should the consolidation of the public budget gain first priority in politics? Equality was one of the guiding political principles of the former GDR and should therefore still be present in Eastern Germany, if the socialization in the social system of the GDR still has an impact. However, the impact of socialization is often superimposed by subsequent developments. Especially the import of the institutional framework from Western Germany, whose principles are not in the same way based on equality, may have caused a change in those attitudes.

This is most likely among the MPs due to their intensified involvement in the institutions of the political system.

The analysis of the answer patterns reveals that both the elite and the population in Eastern Germany stress the importance of downsizing social inequality a bit more than in Western Germany. However, the more pronounced distinction in both parts of the country is the larger share of elite members who stress first of all a balanced budget, whereas more citizens than elite members favour enhancement of economic growth. Controlling the role of the Post-Communists reveals that almost all of them demand politics to first of all downsize social inequality. In contrast, the remaining members of the political elite in Eastern Germany are very much in favour of promoting economic growth. Thus, in contrast to the findings in the previous chapters the East-West gap among the political elite even increases, if we control for the Post-Communists. Nevertheless, the difference between elites and population regarding the saliency of policy-goals is very much the same in Eastern and Western Germany. However, the accentuation of equality in Eastern Germany is basically the task of the Post-Communists.

(Graph 12: Policy-Trilemma)

(Graph 13: Policy-Trilemma – controlled for Post-Communists)

Planned economy constituted another principle that guided politics and constituted the institutional framework in the former GDR. Although in Western Germany until 1989 the state was also intended to play an active role in the economy (*Rheinischer Kapitalismus*), the state (or rather the communist party) in Eastern Germany was responsible for all details of the economy. Asking the population and the political elite about the scope of state-interventionism reveals both an East-West-gap and an elite-population gap. Whereas the majority of the population in Eastern Germany and a substantial minority of 46 percent in Western Germany are very much in favour of state-influence on the labour-market, a majority of the elite in both parts of the country rejects this concept. At the same time the rejection of state interventions among the elite is less pronounced in Eastern Germany and the share of supporters of state-interventionism among the population in Eastern Germany counts 21 percent points more than among the Western population. However, if we control for the MPs of the Post-Communists, the East-West-gap in the political elite disappears.

(Graph 14: State-Interventionism)

(Graph 15: State-Interventionism – controlled for Post-Communists)

The state was not only responsible for the economy in the former GDR but also for social security. The “unity of economic and social policy” was one of the central policies the GDR-elite introduced to secure the support of the population and thus generating output-based legitimacy for the political system. Since re-unification, discussions about individualizing responsibility for social security have been put forward. In contrast to the question of state-interventionism, the differences between elite and population on the one hand and between Eastern and Western Germany on the other hand are rather marginal, even although the elite in Eastern Germany is slightly more in favour of individualizing responsibility for social security. If we control for Post-Communists, the share of supporters for this policy among the Eastern Elite increases, which widens their distance towards the Eastern (and Western) population. But still, the differences are rather small and the homogeneous denial of this policy among the Post-Communists is no reflection of a majority in the population.

(Graph 16: Individualizing social security)

(Graph 17: Individualizing social security – controlled for Post-Communists)


Whereas the three previously analysed policies are rather linked to the legacy of the socialisation in the former GDR, the policy analysed finally refers to the present situation in Germany and offers a rather heterogeneous picture. First of all the support for diverging policies that are adapted to the different situation in Eastern and in Western Germany is stronger in the Eastern part of the country. This is especially true among the Eastern elite, in which a majority of roughly three out of four Eastern German MPs support this demand. In contrast to the previous issues this majority is not due to the Post-Communists. Moreover, they are even more cautious in their claim. In Western Germany this demand is rather controversial: a narrow majority of the Western population denies the necessity of different regional policies and in contrast a narrow majority among the elite is in favour of. Concerning this issue the East-West-gap is by far more pronounced than the elite-population gap.

(Graph 18: Demand for different Policies in Eastern and Western Germany)

(Graph 19: Demand for different Policies in Eastern and Western Germany – controlled for PC)

In order to give a comprehensive overview for the policy results and to analyse, if the differences could be analysed in terms of both an elite-population and eastern-western dimension, we use again *Correspondence Analysis* (Graph 2). The first dimension (=vertical dimension) comprises 69 percent of the inertia and the second dimension 23 percent, which calls for separate analyses of both dimensions (Table 3). The first dimension (=vertical dimension) is clearly determined by the question of state-interventionism and by the call for a consolidated state budget, although the latter is of minor impact. In terms of congruence between elite and population, this dimension distinguishes mainly the elite from the population. But the East-West-differentiation can be located on this dimension as well, since the position of the population in Eastern Germany is again more distanced from the political elite, whereby the elite is unified – except of the Post-Communists, who are close to the population on the elite-population dimension. As already observed for the politics, the distance between elite and population is more pronounced as the distinction between Eastern and Western population. The second dimension distinguishes again the Post-Communists from both the remaining MPs and the population. This dimension is mainly constituted by the concurrent policy-priorities downsizing social inequality and enhancing economic growth but also by the refusal resp. endorsement of individualizing social security. Thus, the second dimension is primarily a Post-Communist dimension on which this party is separated both from the population and the remaining elite members. The issue of diverging East-West-Policies has no influence on one of these dimensions; moreover, it constitutes a third dimension that is not reported here but which distinguishes mainly the Eastern and the Western part of Germany and is therefore the sole definite East-West-dimension.


Graph 2: Correspondence Analysis for Policies



(For details see: Table 3 in the Appendix)

The combination of both, procedures and policies, in an integrated *Correspondence Analysis* repeats the results in a comprehensive manner (Graph 3). It reveals again a gap between elite and population and a gap between Eastern and Western population, whereby the latter is less prominent than the former. The Post-Communists – as part of the political elite – are in some respects close to the population, while in other respects they differ from both elite and population. Regarding the analyzed politics and policies the East-West gap is not completely different from the gap that separates elite and population. The only exception is the question for different policies in Eastern and Western Germany. The greatest difference could be found between Western elite and Eastern population, both of which represent conflicting expectations about how politics are exerted and about what the tasks and the output of the political system should be. The political elites demand an important role of party-elites in a weak state whereby the population demands a marginal role of party-elites in a strong state.

Graph 3: Correspondence Analysis for Institutionally Defined Procedures and Policies



(For details see: Table 4 in the Appendix)

Analysis of the Consequences of the Elite-Population Gap

One precondition of our hypothesis mentioned in the beginning is given: there is gap between Eastern elite and Eastern population, even if one considers that the Post-Communists are part of the elite, which scales down the gap on some issues. Furthermore, this gap between elite and population is found in Western Germany too, even though it is slightly less pronounced. Therefore, the impact of the elite-population gap on the evaluation of the political system should be tested for both Eastern and Western Germany. The following linear regression analyzes, if the attitudes towards the mentioned procedures and policies are significantly related to the satisfaction with the performance of democracy in Germany.

The general character of this indicator is no disadvantage, since it allows testing multiple causes of satisfaction and dissatisfaction at the same time. To put forward the argument, that the population-elite-gap has consequences for the satisfaction, one has to show that incongruence between elite and population causes dissatisfaction *independently* of alternative explanations. Therefore the model includes three control variables in order to test alternative explanations: education, satisfaction with the economic performance of the whole country and the relative deprivation, i.e. the sense of gaining the fair share in life compared to other people. Education is considered to serve as rough indicator political involvement. The assumptions are twofold: on the one hand higher education enables to comprehend the way politics proceeds, which can lead to more positive evaluations. At the same time, higher education may increase the perception of external efficacy and thus reduce the feeling of helplessness. Thus, satisfaction with democracy is ought to increase with higher education. The impact of the two remaining control variables should be strong, if the evaluation is based on the output of democracy in economic and social terms. Thereby, the economic performance refers to the

more general and abstract level of the whole country, while the relative deprivation refers to the individual situation.

What are our expectations about the influence of the attitudes towards the institutionally defined procedures and towards the policies? In generally, we assume that the more the attitudes of the individuals differ from those that are prevalent within the elite, the more these persons are dissatisfied with the performance of democracy.

However, this is not true for each and every policy or institutionally defined procedure but requires some specification. Since the hypothesis assumes that there is a prevalent attitude among the elite, those variables should exhibit the hugest impact, in which the elite displays a majority close to consensus and the population does not. There is an ongoing controversy about whether it is sufficient for representative democracy that the preferences of the population are articulated in the legislature, or if they are represented only in case they are transformed into policy-outputs (Weissberg 1978; Brettschneider 1995: 68-98). Without claiming to decide this controversy, we would argue that articulating preferences is a necessary condition for representation. Thus, if preferences are not articulated on elite level, the system lacks representation. The argument is transferable to the institutionally defined procedures: if the political elites have unified role-perceptions and attitudes about how politics are organized and they exert politics that way, those citizens who possess different concepts feel distance and dissatisfaction with the political system.

If the representative elites display a consensus about a certain issue, divergent preferences are not articulated; this in turn leads to dissatisfaction. However, it is not necessary that both elite and population share exactly the same distribution of preferences. Even in case population and elite display diverging majorities concerning an issue, representation occurs in case there is a visible minority dissenting among the elite, which represents the preferences of the majority among the population. Thus, the probability of an issue to become a crucial determinant for dissatisfaction with democracy increases, the more the elite is homogeneous concerning this issue.

To begin with the overall impact of all variable, Table 1 shows, the R^2 of Eastern Germany is the same as in Western Germany, which indicates that the included variables altogether explain the same share of satisfaction with democracy in both parts of the country.

At first we analyse the influence of the control variables. Let aside education, they appear as the most important determinants in both parts of the country – with the exception of relative deprivation in Western Germany. The evaluation of country's economic performance and the relative deprivation are both measuring the output dimension of democracy. Their strong impact indicates that citizens in Eastern Germany weight the economic and social results of democratic politics as more important for their satisfaction with democracy than the way politics are preceded or the scope their attitudes are represented in the political process.

The impact of the remaining variables in Eastern and Western Germany shows the expected direction: the higher the distance to the dominant attitude in the elite, the higher the dissatisfaction with the performance of democracy. However, not all of them are significant, which requires a careful step-by-step interpretation.

The more one refuses coherent voting behaviour, the less one is satisfied with the performance of democracy. The elite in both parts of the country displays a huge majority in favour on this issue (67 percent in Eastern Germany without Post-Communists and 75 in Western Germany), while the population is rather heterogeneous with a slight majority denying the need for coherent voting behaviour (Graph 7). Therefore the elite-population gap on this issue is considerable in both parts of the coun-

try, which is also indicated by the huge contribution of this variable to the inertia in the *Correspondence Analysis* (Table 2).

Table 1: Linear Regression for Satisfaction with the Performance of Democracy (Population only)

		Satisfaction with the performance of democracy in Germany (beta) ¹		
		Eastern Germany	Western Germany	
Procedures	Demand for coherent voting behaviour ²	.08*	.07*	
	Reference: entire country, electoral district, own party	Focus of representation: own voters	-.06	-.04
	Reference: Leadership/Balance of Leadership and Responsiveness	Primary task of MPs: Responsiveness	-.04	.05
Policies	Reference: Budget, Growth	Primary policy-goal: downsize inequality	-.06	-.08*
	Approval of state-interventionism ²		-.06	-.12**
	Endorse individualizing social security ²		.04	.03
	Demand for East-West-Policies ²		.01	.07*
Control	Formal Education ³		.04	.01
	Evaluation of country's economic performance ⁴		.20***	.27***
	Reference: much less/less than my fair share ⁵	Rel. Deprivation: more than/my fair share ⁵	.22***	.10**
R ²		.15	.14	
N		799	790	
Significance levels: *** sig. < 0.001; ** sig. < 0.01; * sig. < 0.05;				
¹ satisfied (4)-dissatisfied (1)				
² strongly agree (4)-strongly disagree (1)				
³ no school-degree/elementary school (1) secondary school (2) A-Level (3) University diploma (4)				
⁴ "How do you evaluate the general economic situation in Germany? Is the situation very good (5), good (4), partly good/partly bad (3), bad (4) or very bad (5)?"				
⁵ "Compared to the living condition of other people in Germany: do you think you get your fair share (3), more than your fair share (4), less than your fair share (2), much less than your fair share (1)?" Categories "3" and "4" are collapsed into 1 and "1" and "2" are collapsed into "0".				

A huge majority of the political elite in Eastern and Western Germany supports – and even more practice – party discipline. Alternative conceptions of democracy that refrain the decisive role of parties are only represented by a minority, which cannot prevent dissatisfaction among those citizens who refute parties as weightily actors. Those citizens perceive politics as exerted in the wrong way and they could not identify any serious challenger of this practice among the elite. Even the Post-Communists who increase the dissenting minority in Eastern Germany substantially to 44 percent are not able to change that perception (Graph 6). Two reasons may explain their inability to close the elite-population gap on this issue. First, if they are in government, a majority of their MPs is

also in favour of coherent voting behaviour, which reveals that their refusal is rather due to their long-lasting opposition status than to deep-rooted convictions. Second, they are still not a fully accepted part of the interplay of government and opposition. Both circumstances may weaken the perception of the Post-Communists as serious challengers of the institutionally defined procedures, which in turn diminishes their potential for effective representation of dissenting interests. Nevertheless, this is a first hint that the link between lack of representation and dissatisfaction may not be as straightforward as suggested.

Concerning the representational focus on the own voters and the decision for responsiveness, the minority among the elite who shares these preferences is even smaller than for the coherent voting behaviour (Graph 8 and Graph 10), but contrary to the assumption, the two variables have no significant influence. One has to consider that these institutionally defined procedures are more abstract and thus rather difficult to perceive – especially in comparison to coherent voting behaviour. This hints us towards a first possible intervening variable: the perception of how politics is exerted. If people do not perceive the representational gap or that politics is not exerted the way they conceive it, the in fact existing incongruence has no influence on the satisfaction with democracy. However, the more homogenous the elite appears the more the perception of incongruence becomes possible.

The picture is even more diverse if we now turn to the impact of policy-attitudes. If citizens in Western Germany put downsizing social inequality as highest on the political agenda, they are more likely to be dissatisfied with democracy. In Eastern Germany a preference for equality does not decrease the satisfaction with democracy, although the supporters of equality amount around 40-50 percent among the elites in both parts of the country - if we include the Post-Communists (Graph 12). According to the assumption the direction and force of influence should be equal in Eastern and Western Germany. The first rationale to explain this deviant outcome relates to the difference in the agent of representation in Eastern and Western Germany. In Eastern Germany, this preference is represented mainly by the Post-Communists and the mode of representation-by-party seems to put that preference more efficient in the spotlight of the political process than in Western Germany. Second, that downsizing inequality has an impact in Western Germany although 42 percent of MPs share this priority, may be due to the saliency-character of the question. Because an important issue that is ranking at a position of the political agenda that is lower than the own expectations appears potentially more dissatisfying than an issue, which is high on the agenda but treated against the own conceptions. Here we find another hint for another intervening variable: the saliency of issues. Highly salient issues can have a greater impact on the satisfaction with democracy, if there is a gap of representation. Vice versa, issues display no impact of the satisfaction even in case of pronounced incongruence between elite and population, if they are not salient in the eyes of the citizens.

In contrast, the question for state-intervention supports the mentioned hypothesis. The more citizens demand state interventions in the labour-market, the more they are dissatisfied with the democratic performance. The reason can be found in the preferences of the elite concerning this issue: only a tiny minority of eight percent endorses state-interventions in Western Germany, which is so marginal that the position of state-interventionism is virtually not represented among the western political elite. Due to the Post-Communists, the minority of interventionists among the eastern political elite amounts 22 percent. This substantial minority turns out to be sufficient for supporters of state-interventionism to feel represented, which makes them not dissatisfied

Individualizing social security is a controversial issue among both the population and the political elite – let aside the Post-Communists. Therefore and in accordance with the assumptions no influ-

ence of the preferences concerning individualized social security can be recognized, since all positions are represented among the elite.

The demand for different policies in Eastern and Western Germany has only significant impact in the Western part of the country. Although a huge majority of the Eastern elite is in favour of adapted policies, there is still a substantial minority, which represents the dissenting opinion and the majority of both elite and population endorse diverging policies. The majorities in Western Germany are different, the political elites are in favour and the population is against adapted policies. But these majorities are rather narrow and elite and population are rather heterogeneous. Thus, according to the assumption, there should be no impact of this issue on the satisfaction with democracy, which is falsified by empirical evidence for Western Germany.

To summarize: the empirical evidence for the consequences of the elite-population gap is mixed both for the institutionally defined procedures and for the policies as well. If the elite is close to consensus, a lack of representation is very likely but a heterogeneous elite, which represents different preferences does not necessarily prevent a representational lack. Thus, it is difficult to define a threshold of a minimum amount of MPs supporting an issue that secures the feeling of being represented.

Preliminary conclusion (requires further development)

The understanding of the institutionally defined procedures and the attitudes towards some policies differ between the population and the political elite in Eastern Germany. In this respect, one *conditio sine qua non* for dissatisfaction with the political process appears to be confirmed. However, this incongruence is not a special phenomenon of Eastern Germany or the transition process: the population in Western Germany is also distanced from the/their political elite. The horizontal integration of the political elites from Eastern and Western Germany was rather successful; they are integrated as political elite – except for the Post-Communists. In contrast, the population is less integrated but in comparison to the elite-population gap, the East-West gap at population level is of subordinate relevance. It is even possible to embrace the East-West and the elite-population gap on one dimension, whereby Western elite and Eastern population represent the most distinct understandings of the institutionally defined procedures of democracy and also of some policy goals. Thus, the distance of the citizens in Eastern Germany towards the elite in terms of the procedures is the intensified version of the same distance of the Western German population to the political elite.

The lack of congruence in terms of institutionally defined procedures seems to be grounded in the different degree of involvement of elite and population in the political system. Therefore the greater distance of the Eastern German population may be due to their still shorter experience with the institutional framework, but also to the rapid adaptation of their political elite, which left their population behind in their understanding of the “normal” institutionally defined procedures. Further, one has to keep in mind that the political elite from Western Germany exceeds their colleagues from Eastern Germany concerning their number, visibility and impact on politics, which shifts the entire German political elite closer to the position of the Western political elite and increases the distance to the Eastern German population. Interestingly, the horizontal integration of the political elites from Eastern and Western Germany is not restricted to the procedures but affects as well policies. To explore whether this is an effect of the institutional socialization, the close interaction with their western colleagues, or simply due to selection effects during the recruitment process, has not been a task of this paper.

However, a conclusion on the consequences of the representational gap cannot be drawn, before we have not considered the exception of the Post-Communists and the logic of political representation. The Post-Communists are closer to the population – even to the Western one – than to the remaining political elite. In this respect they have the potential to downsize the lack of vertical integration. But they are still struggling with their legacy as successor of the former Communist party, which challenges their legitimacy in the eyes of potential partners for coalition-governments. In this respect, their potential for implementing their dissenting positions is rather low. However, if this potential increases by their unchallenged integration into the interplay between government and opposition, a widening of their gap from the population is very likely. Therefore the dilemma of the Post-Communists is that their potential to downsize the elite-population gap results out of their still challenged legitimacy, but if they gain legitimacy, they will probably lose the potential to downsize the lack of vertical integration due to the increasing horizontal integration.


With regard to the logic of representation we have seen that there is no attitude on policies or understanding of procedures that is characterized completely by antagonistic positions of elite and population. Such antagonism would have found its expression in a consensual majority among the elite that manifests itself as contradictory to a consensual majority among the population. Even in the case of comparatively clear majorities within the elite, there are still minorities left that represents the dissenting positions. As far as this is secured, every position in the population is represented in the political process – although not necessarily in terms of political outcomes. Thus, it is not possible to conclude from every gap to a lack of perceived representation.

Different intervening variables have to be considered. At first, the saliency of an issue in the population could intervene. The less salient an issue is evaluated, the less citizens care about its representation. Second, the question of the agent or who is representing the issue could intervene. If the issue is represented by parties or fraction of the political elite with certain characteristics, as no chance to implement their agenda due to their distance to governmental participation, the feeling of representation might not emerge. The third intervening variable might be the perception of representation. In case of homogeneous political elites it is alleviated for citizens to identify that their own position is not represented but the more heterogeneous the elite becomes the more it becomes a complex process, which may lead to misperceptions. Last, but not least, the question whether the preferences are transformed into political outcome or, at least are perceived as being transformed, has to be considered. Even if citizens perceive their attitudes represented by articulation on elite level, they may become dissatisfied, if their attitudes are never implemented in policy-output.

However, since the articulation on elite level is a necessary condition for implementation, the larger the dissimilarity becomes, i.e. the more homogeneous the elite becomes in comparison to the population, the probability of a representational lack that causes consequences increases. We can even argue: if an issue is decreasing the satisfaction with democracy while elite and population are divided on this issue, this incongruence is one determinant for dissatisfaction. The research on political culture should therefore be extended towards the representational dimension, which means the comparison of political elites and population regarding their political culture. (to be reframed/continued)

Appendix

Graph 4: Satisfaction with the performance of democracy



Means


2,38	2,73
------	------

2,62	3,08
------	------

Significance Levels of ANOVA

	Population East	Elite East	Population West	Elite West
Population East	-			
Elite East	***	-		
Population West	***	*	-	
Elite West	***	***	***	-

Graph 5: Satisfaction with the performance of democracy – controlled for MPs of Post-Communists




Means

2,38	2,93	2,32	2,62	3,10
------	------	------	------	------

Significance Levels of ANOVA

	Population East	Elite East	Post-Communists	Population West	Elite West
Population East	-				
Elite East	***	-			
Post-Communists	n.s.	***	-		
Population West	***	***	***	-	
Elite West	***	**	***	***	-

Graph 6: Demand for coherent voting behaviour



□ strongly disagree ▨ disagree somewhat ▩ agree somewhat ▤ strongly agree

Means


2,24	2,56
------	------

2,08	2,96
------	------

Significance Levels of ANOVA

	Population East	Elite East	Population West	Elite West
Population East	-			
Elite East	***	-		
Population West	**	***	-	
Elite West	***	***	***	-

Graph 7: Demand for coherent voting behaviour – controlled for Post-Communists



□ strongly disagree ▨ disagree somewhat ▩ agree somewhat ▩ strongly agree

Means


2,24	2,82	2,08
------	------	------

2,08	2,98
------	------

Significance Levels of ANOVA

	Population East	Elite East	Post-Communists	Population West	Elite West
Population East	-				
Elite East	***	-			
Post-Communists	n.s.	***	-		
Population West	**	***	n.s.	-	
Elite West	***	n.s.	***	***	-


Graph 8: Demanded Focus of Representation



Significance Levels of Chi-Square-Tests

	Population East	Elite East	Population West	Elite West
Population East	-			
Elite East	***	-		
Population West	**	***	-	
Elite West	***	*	***	-


Graph 9: Demanded Focus of Representation – controlled for MPs of Post-Communists



Significance Levels of Chi-Square-Tests

	Population East	Elite East	Post-Communists	Population West	Elite West
Population East	-				
Elite East	***	-			
Post-Communists	***	***	-		
Population West	**	***	***	-	
Elite West	***	n.s.	***	***	-


Graph 10: Decision between Leadership and Responsiveness



Significance Levels of Chi-Square-Tests

Population East	Population East	Elite East	Population West	Elite West
Population East	-			
Elite East	***	-		
Population West	n.s.	***	-	
Elite West	***	**	***	-


Graph 11: Decision between Leadership and Responsiveness – controlled for Post Communists



Significance Levels of Chi-Square-Tests

	Population East	Elite East	Post-Communists	Population West	Elite West
Population East	-				
Elite East	***	-			
Post-Communists	***	**	-		
Population West	n.s.	***	***	-	
Elite West	***	n.s.	***	***	-


Graph 12: Policy-Trilemma



Significance Levels of Chi-Square-Tests

	Population East	Elite East	Population West	Elite West
Population East	-			
Elite East	***	-		
Population West	***	n.s.	-	
Elite West	***	**	***	-


Graph 13: Policy-Trilemma – controlled for Post-Communists



Significance Levels of Chi-Square-Tests

Population East	Population East	Elite East	Post-Communists	Population West	Elite West
Population East	-				
Elite East	***	-			
Post-Communists	***	***	-		
Population West	***	***	***	-	
Elite West	***	***	***	***	-

Graph 14: State-Interventionism



□ strongly disagree ▨ disagree somewhat ▩ agree somewhat ▤ strongly agree

Means


2,91	2,00
------	------

2,45	1,74
------	------

Significance Levels of ANOVA

	Population East	Elite East	Population West	Elite West
Population East	-			
Elite East	***	-		
Population West	***	***	-	
Elite West	***	***	***	-

Graph 15: State-Interventionism – controlled for Post-Communists



□ strongly disagree ▨ disagree somewhat ▩ agree somewhat ▤ strongly agree

Means


Population East	1,79	2,50
-----------------	------	------

Population West	1,71
-----------------	------

Significance Levels of ANOVA

	Population East	Elite East	Post-Communists	Population West	Elite West
Population East	-				
Elite East	***	-			
Post-Communists	***	***	-		
Population West	***	***	n.s.	-	
Elite West	***	n.s.	***	***	-

Graph 16: Individualizing social security



□ strongly disagree ▨ disagree somewhat ▩ agree somewhat ▤ strongly agree

Means


2,59	2,41
------	------

2,62	2,63
------	------

Significance Levels of ANOVA

	Population East	Elite East	Population West	Elite West
Population East	-			
Elite East	*	-		
Population West	n.s.	**	-	
Elite West	n.s.	**	n.s.	-

Graph 17: Individualizing social security – controlled for Post-Communists



□ strongly disagree ▨ disagree somewhat ▩ agree somewhat ▤ strongly agree

Means


2,59	2,80	1,62
------	------	------

2,62	2,66
------	------

Significance Levels of ANOVA

	Population East	Elite East	Post-Communists	Population West	Elite West
Population East	-				
Elite East	*	-			
Post-Communists	***	***	-		
Population West	n.s.	n.s.	***	-	
Elite West	n.s.	n.s.	***	n.s.	-

Graph 18: Demand for different Policies in Eastern and Western Germany



□ strongly disagree ▨ disagree somewhat ▩ agree somewhat ■ strongly agree

Means


2,69	3,00
------	------

2,36	2,54
------	------

Significance Levels of ANOVA

	Population East	Elite East	Population West	Elite West
Population East	-			
Elite East	***	-		
Population West	***	***	-	
Elite West	**	***	**	-

Graph 19: Demand for different Policies in Eastern and Western Germany – controlled for PC



□ strongly disagree ▨ disagree somewhat ▩ agree somewhat ▤ strongly agree

Means

2,69	3,06	2,85
------	------	------

2,36	2,54
------	------

Significance Levels of ANOVA

	Population East	Elite East	Post-Communists	Population West	Elite West
Population East	-				
Elite East	***	-			
Post-Communists	n.s.	n.s.	-		
Population West	***	***	***	-	
Elite West	*	***	**	**	-

Table 2: Correspondence Analysis for Institutionally Defined Procedures

Dimension	Inertia	Contribution of Dimension to Total Inertia (%)
1	,148	,891
2	,014	,082
3	,004	,022
4	,001	,005
Total	,167	1,000

Row	Contribution of Row to Inertia of Dimension (%)	
	1	2
DissatisfactionDemo	,157	,234
SatisfactionDemo	,085	,122
DenialPartyUnity	,078	,029
ApprovPartyUnity	,096	,011
RepVoters	,083	,003
RepParty	,010	,281
RepUniv	,011	,036
Leadership	,148	,005
Responsiveness	,174	,090
Leadership and Responsiveness	,158	,190
Total	1,000	1,000

Column	Contribution of Column to Inertia of Dimension (%)	
	1	2
PopEast	,218	,000
PopWest	,117	,095
EliteEast	,146	,000
EliteWest	,518	,010
PostCo (elite)	,002	,895
Total	1,000	1,000

Table 3: Correspondence Analysis for Policies

Dimension	Inertia	Contribution of Dimension to Total Inertia (%)
1	,075	,690
2	,024	,225
3	,009	,082
4	,000	,003
Total	,108	1,000

Row	Contribution of Row to Inertia of Dimension (%)	
	1	2
StateInterv: No	,340	,031
StateInterv: Yes	,479	,044
DownSocIneq	,048	,199
EconGrowth	,003	,211
ConPubBudget	,098	,029
EWPol:No	,000	,002
EWPol:Yes	,000	,001
IndivSocSec:No	,015	,269
StateInterv: No	,017	,215
Total	1,000	1,000

Column	Contribution of Column to Inertia of Dimension (%)	
	1	2
PopEast	,337	,074
PopWest	,011	,028
EliteEast	,166	,048
EliteWest	,423	,046
PostCo (elite)	,063	,805
Total	1,000	1,000

Table 4: Correspondence Analysis for Institutionally Defined Procedures and Policies

Dimension	Inertia	Contribution of Dimension to Total Inertia (%)
1	,109	,729
2	,020	,143
3	,007	,050
4	,002	,015
Total	,137	1,000

Row	Contribution of Row to Inertia of Dimension (%)	
	1	2
DissatisfactionDemo	,116	,045
SatisfactionDemo	,060	,024
DenialPartyUnity	,053	,003
ApprovPartyUnity	,061	,000
RepVoters	,056	,005
RepParty	,005	,113
RepUniv	,007	,013
Leadership	,096	,011
Responsiveness	,116	,053
Leadership and Responsiveness	,100	,087
StateInterv: No	,121	,000
StateInterv: Yes	,165	,000
DownSocIneq	,010	,150
EconGrowth	,003	,093
ConPubBudget	,026	,055
EWPol:No	,000	,011
EWPol:Yes	,001	,010
IndivSocSec:No	,002	,184
StateInterv: No	,003	,143
Total	1,000	1,000

Column	Contribution of Column to Inertia of Dimension (%)	
	1	2
PopEast	,264	,005
PopWest	,073	,084
EliteEast	,155	,018
EliteWest	,498	,002
PostCo (elite)	,010	,890
Total	1,000	1,000

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