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**Party Unity in Evolving Parliamentary Democracies: The Socialization of Representatives, the Impact of Democratic Competition, and Other Factors Leading to ‘Deviant Cases’**

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**Abstract:** It has generally been acknowledged that the parliamentary type of government induces more cohesive and, hence, more party based modes of representation. Even though this is true, the relationship is far from being perfect and it can be stated that in newly established parliamentary democracies party cohesion is an indicator of institutionalization. This paper investigates systematically and comparatively how party unity of parliamentary democracies developed shortly after the installation of a/the parliamentary government. It explores to what extent the institutions’ incentive structure (i.e. discipline and self discipline, respectively) or processes of socialisation (i.e. party cohesion) are causes of party unity. After in depth analysis of single cases, a multivariate analysis tries to control for intervening factors. The findings support the notion that - despite the strong rationale of acting within a parliamentary type of government - processes of socialisation do account for party unity. Interestingly, there is some explanatory power of intervening factors which are cultural (e.g. ideology of party, revolutionary experiences). Deviant cases, where party unity is generally low despite the parliamentary principle, will be analysed separately. A more general theoretical statement of low levels of party unity in parliamentary governments will be sketched: democratic competition itself may be defect or not fully evolved. The findings and theoretical arguments make the further research on party unity highly recommendable which does not only focus on recent parliaments but, too, looks closer on historical cases. Eventually, turning towards the European Parliament, the final section briefly shows why the historical comparison of the patterns of party unity could be highly relevant for institutional engineering of democratic representation in the European Union.

1. **Introduction**

When institutions are (re-) founded or set up for the first time there is a process of institutionalization. In this process, the social reality of the new institution becomes the typical ‘institutional form’ of the respective institution with relative stability (Polsby 1968, Clegg/Hardy 1999, Khmelko/Patzelt 2011, and see particularly the review at Kistner 2007). This stability is a major feature of institutions (Patzelt 2007). Important institutions of political systems are the system of government (or parliamentary government/democracy), i.e. the nexus of parliament and government; in Europe this is the parliamentary type of government in which the government depends of a majority of the parliament which prevents them of being brought to fall. Parliamentary government set into practice the ideal of party government and party based political competition where programs and performance of the government and its respective opponents will be judged by voters on election day. All in all, this turn politics into a ‘team sport’ (Patzelt 2003: 112) of at least two opposing camps. Although this ideal may be clouded by bicameralism, federalism, multi-party coalitions and

¹ The author of this paper is a doctoral candidate at the Technical University of Dresden; he is a scholarship holder of the German Research Foundation. This paper is an exploration of some of the causal processes that are to be analysed in detail in the doctoral dissertation project of the author. Therefore, please note that the arguments and data presented here are preliminary. Comments are very welcome and may be addressed to erik@fritzsche-net.de.
minority cabinets, a fundamental precondition for its practice and the respective 
accountability of the political processes as well as government stability and the overall 
performance of this type of government is the unity of its parliamentary party groups 
makes sure that success and failure of the implementation of policy alternatives can be 
attributed to the governing parties or that each of the opposition parties can – visibly – 
present a coherent alternative to the government’s performance (Strom 2000, Müller 2000, 
Strom/Müller/Bergmann 2003, Carey 2009). Party unity, therefore, is an indicator of 
institutionalization of a parliamentary government (Kistner 2007).

However, there has never been investigated systematically and comparatively how party unity 
of parliamentary democracies developed shortly after the respective system of government 
was installed. However, some country specific research dealt with the unity of parties in such 
emerging democracies (Saalfeld 1995, Messerschmidt 2005, Wilson/Wiste 1976, MacRae 
paper, however, asks in general: How and why develops party unity in institutionalizing 
parliamentary systems of government? –Party unity is to be understood as voting unity, albeit 
other forms of unity (e.g., in media statements and tactical and strategic cooperation) could be 
subsumed under the concept, as well. This, however, cannot be analysed in broad 
international comparison since data is not available.2

In doing so, models helpful for comparative research can be found in an extensive theoretical 
literature on party unity (see Patzelt 2003, Bergman et al. 2003, Hazan 2003, Olson 2003, 
Andreweg/Thomassen forthcoming, Kam 2009) and empirical research dealing with a specific 
parliament (see Messerschmidt 2005, Saalfeld 1995, Skjæveland 1999, Valencia-Escamilla 
2005, Könne 2009). Despite these efforts, there is sparse comparative work available yet 
which is – moreover – either illustrative (Ozbudun 1970), restricted to certain regions 
(Mainwaring/Shugart 1997, Jensen 2000, Morgenstern 2004, Sieberer 2006), limited to 
statistical techniques and a subset of relevant variables and cases (Poiré 2003, Carey 2007, 
Kailitz 2008, Kam 2009) or exploring some hypotheses by considering only very few cases 
(Depauw 2003, Döring 2003, Carey 2003, Davidson-Schmich 2003, 2006a and 2006b, 
Thames 2005 and 2007). Apart from that, there are lots of single case studies (see Owens 
2003 and Fritzsche 2009 for a guide to the relevant literature).

This empirical research design turns not only to the CEE countries. Although their experience 
is highly interesting and will be part of the empirical data base of this paper, the formation of 
Western parliaments can be investigated under this research question, as well. The population 
under investigation are PPGs in systems which have just adopted a parliamentary 
government. It is reasonable to compare the parliaments of CEE countries with their

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2 In German political science the concept of ‘political strategy’ has recently got a systematic attention 
(Raschke/Tils 2007, Raschke/Tils 2010). In doing so, party unity has been recognized as an inevitable political 
resource in the strategy making; it is, too, highly relevant for the strategic calculations of party leaders and 
political competitors (Rachke/Tils 2007: 255f).
counterparts in Western countries under similar conditions, i.e. to compare processes of institutionalization (cf. Olson/Norton 2008). – Of course, one can only analyse those countries for which empirical data is available. In this paper all relevant data on this topic will be presented, cautiously analysed and interpreted – and remarks on highly relevant and necessary future research will be made.

The paper is organized as follows: Firstly, theoretical expectation will be outlined on how party unity should develop in periods after the parliamentary regime was set up. The distinction between (self) discipline and cohesion is crucial since there exist conflicting hypothesis for each to some extent (Hazan 2003, cf. Andeweg/Thomassen forthcoming). Secondly, the respective empirical patterns of party unity will be analysed on a case by case basis for all available data on the representative assemblies of Lithuania, Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, and Slovenia as well as for the German Bundestag after 1949, the parliaments of the new German Länder after 1990, the Reichstag of Weimar, the National Assembly of the French Fourth and Fifth Republic. The case analysis helps to detect intervening factors. Therefore, thirdly, multivariate analysis will try to control for these effects on a basis of 191 observations, i.e. PPGs in several time periods. A fourth section of the paper will analyse ‘deviant cases’, i.e. parliamentary democracies with party unity below the expected high levels, and will deal with some ideas for the reasons of this pattern. The last section discusses some implications of the research for newly emerging parliamentary types of government, in particular for the further evolution of the European Parliament.

2. Theory
A fundamental argument of legislative specialists is that a parliamentary government, i.e. the government depends on the confidence of the parliament (Steffani 1979, cf. Decker 2009), is leading to a high level of party unity due to a special incentive structure (e.g., see Ozbudun 1970, Olson 2003, Hazan 2003, Bergman et al. 2003). At the beginning of a legislative term each PPG will be forced to decide upon the government, either to bring it into office (or at least to refrain from bringing it to fall as it was brought into office by other institutions, such as a monarch or a president) or deny support and – may be – actively work against its stability, i.e. bringing it down if possible. Provided that the competition is party based, i.e. that party labels provide a considerable value for voters and politicians regarding the respective national policy alternatives, than there will be a number of government friendly PPGs who try to implement their policies and to deliver what they have promised their voters. Therefore, if party unity is crumbling, the promised policy alternative cannot be implemented and the respective value of the party label will shrink.³ Opposition parties are somewhat ‘infected’ by that logic since they have to appear as a coherent policy alternative in order to be a credible aspirant for the next government. Indeed, the respective correlation between a parliamentary type of government is remarkably high, albeit not perfect (Kailitz 2008).

³ Of course, party unity itself is not a sufficient condition for delivering a promised policy since highly united parties may ‘survive without governing’, i.e. they simply technically fail to implement their policy proposals or they have promised policies which cannot be implemented. Nevertheless, high party unity seems to be a necessary condition to implement a party’s policy under a parliamentary government.
It is therefore reasonable to expect that PPGs in newly set up parliamentary governments are quite united as well. Hard rational choice theory leads to the expectation that actors will almost immediately recognize the new incentive structure of the institution and adapt their behaviour accordingly. Under this rather extreme rationality assumption, party unity should be as high as in established parliamentary systems right from the first day of operation (Davidson-Schmich 2003, 2006a, 2006b). Of course, this is not a realistic assumption. Consequently, this paper is based on the assumption that rationality is bounded and hampered to some extent. Actors need to learn to act according to the cost-benefit structure of their institutional surroundings and to display ‘self discipline’ (i.e. to act differently as they would if they could decide outside the political game). Furthermore, to the extent that party unity is based on discipline (i.e. on sanctions by party leaders or the group as a whole, see Hazan 2003), it is plausible to assume that both leaders and followers need time to understand the logic of functioning with regard to the sanctioning mechanisms. Since the value of party labels plays an important role in the theory of united PPGs in parliamentary types of government, their overall value level might increase, as well: If parties and the party system are totally new, it is plausible to assume that party labels will gain more and more value, i.e. will more and more serve as informational cues to both, potential party members/activist and voters. And the more this is the case, the stronger the incentives to (self-) discipline will be.

Furthermore, it seems problematic to understand party unity as a fully rational phenomenon. The concept of ‘party cohesion’ refers to shared preferences, attitudes, world views, norms, in short: ideology and experiences – i.e. a common socialisation (Hazan 2003, cf. Schwarz/Lambert 1972, Best 1985, Owens 2003, Messerschmidt 2005: 98ff, Janda 1980: 210). This should, too, contribute to a preference homogeneity and solidarity with their colleagues. As times goes by, socialisation effects should contribute more to the phenomenon in question. Additionally, reliability and trust of the PPG’s inner working procedures, in particular the division of labour, should be fostered and increased in time (cf. Andeweg/Thomassen 2011). At the beginning and during the formation of the party system, many party members and even MPs could realize that they got involved in the wrong party or recognize that being a politician is not their preferred career. A respective drop out of these political actors and those which simply refuse to learn should further enhance the group’s homogeneity in time (Könen 2009: 251-258, cf. Messerschmidt 2005: 98ff).

This leads to the expectation of a pattern of convergence: From a more or less high and – due to different starting conditions – for each individual PPG different level of party unity, each party unity score time series of the PPGs should increase and the differences between them should therefore decrease. This is exactly meant by institutionalization: The PPGs’ behaviour fits more and more to the ‘normal form’ of the institution when time goes by. With regard to the time effects of increasing (self) discipline and cohesion one should expect the following

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Könien (2009: 100ff) used the theory of learning in order to show how actors get in touch with the institutional structures. She differed into four modes: learning by thinking about the system in which they act (thinking systematically), looking and copying at the strategies of Westerners (model learning), testing the detected strategies by looking for reactions from role partners (instrumental learning), and that they forget about competing dysfunctional knowledge from their prior socialisation (deleting processes). The concept of ‘self discipline’ is crucial: Given the institutional structure, an actor does act tactically different than he would if he could decide on motions solely for technical reasons.
patterns: To the extent that the institutions induce a respective behaviour due to highly relevant incentive structures, entrance levels of party unity should be high immediately after the parliamentary government is installed. Processes of learning which take place under the condition of hard political competition (i.e. where actors cannot effort not to learn, cf. Deutsch 1963) should run fast: Therefore, party unity should increase considerably from the first to the second term. To the extent that party unity is driven by cohesion, the respective processes should take longer to produce effects and the overall processes of convergence should be stretched. To put it more general: Proportions of the process of convergence which will be observed later can be attributed to socialisation effects; earlier proportions and high entry levels can be attributed to institutional incentive structures which were reliably recognized by (bounded) rational actors. – The following sections will turn to all available data on party unity scores in order to test these theoretical arguments.

3. Empirical Test
After the theoretical arguments for a process of convergence have been outlined, this section will turn to empirical data. For the comparative purpose data on the index of cohesion by Stuart Rice (1928) were collected from country specific literature. Small PPGs with less than ten seats were ignored due to small group inflation of unity scores (Desposato 2004, Carey 2009: 123f). Rice Indices may differ because of a different treatment of abstentions, absentees, the correction of small group inflation and the data base (since open voting is very differently handled among the world’s legislatures). Table 3 shows the sources of the data corpus of this paper and the characteristics of the Rice indices. Where there were several sources available, those were taken which fit better to the data already available. Therefore, the scores are very similar with respect to the calculation of the Rice scores. Some authors treat abstentions as nays which should drop the score compared to such that ignore them. However, this only marginally affects the scores since the number of abstaining votes is usually very low and the Rice scores of these cases seem to be plausibly high and not systematically lower than those of which abstention were ignored (cf. table 1 and table 3). Researchers, furthermore, have to put up with the strongly differing numbers of observations within each parliament since otherwise comparative insights would not be possible. Figure 1 shows scatter plots for each of the respective parliaments and its PPGs’ unity scores. This visualization helps to identify for each of the parliaments how long a possible process of convergence takes. The same will be done by table 1 which shows mean and standard deviations for each of the parliament’s observations in time. The longer the process of convergence takes (i.e. means increase, standard deviations diminish), the more one should

5 The standard Rice Index for each PPG in a given vote calculates ayes minus nays and divides them through the number of MPs voting.
6 PPGs with less than ten seats were ignored since there usually is a problem with small group inflation of unity scores (Desposato 2004). Additionally, it seems reasonable to state that causal processes in small groups may differ.
7 For example, the Czech Republic the data by Carey 2009 did not nicely fit into the existing findings of the literature since his scores were weighted by ‘closeness’ which drops the scores significantly.
8 Experts should, however, adapt their data to the international research agenda and discourses. For this purpose it is reasonable to present the standard Rice scores, too, no matter which index a given researcher finds appropriate. This would make comparative work much more convenient, at least.
expect homogenisation to be the cause since processes of socialisation typically take longer than the learning processes regarding the institutional incentives.

[insert figure 1 and table 1 here]

1. Relatively Smooth Patterns of Convergence

A very smooth convergence pattern can be detected for the PPGs of the parliaments of the new German Länder. For both, the averages of the respective parties (CDU, SPD, FDP, PDS, Greens) and particularly the PPGs of the Landtag of Brandenburg, a steady linear and considerable smooth pattern of convergence of PPGs to high levels of party unity can be stated (mean rises, standard deviation diminishes). Data on the parliament of Saxony shows the same pattern (PPGs’ Rice scores are unavailable, however). The data covers the period from 1990 to 2004. What can explain this considerably smooth pattern? Closer examinations of the processes were conducted by Lübker (1999), Davidson-Schmich (2003, 2006a and 2006b), and Könen (2009). Their analyses, which were grounded on interview data and the literature on the foundation of Eastern German Parliaments, convincingly show that the very high levels of party unity and the subsequent increase rests on the actors’ insights into the logic of parliamentary government and democratic competition – despite the fact that the East German political culture was relatively hostile to parties (cf. Davidson-Schmich 2006b).

However, one should be cautious in rejecting the socialisation hypothesis. There is a relatively remarkable drop out of dissenters, half of which left the political sphere since they did not want to continue a political career and the other half was selected by the parties which denied renomination (Könen 2009: 251-258). If, however, ‘troublemakers’ left the party and those who replaced them were sufficiently screened and selected and/or socialised, cohesion will increase. Note that in the third legislative term cohesion still increased to some extent and that the level of party unity in the parliaments of the old Länder was still somewhat higher (Davidson-Schmich 2003: 97f). This proportion of increase can be much better explained by processes of increasing cohesion, i.e. socialisation of new MPs, than by learning (which should largely be completed after the first legislative term).

This is even more the case since one should pay particular attention to the East German peculiarities. Firstly, the institutions were imported from the Western part of Germany and it was not disputed among politicians and citizens alike that they would work (although some did question the way they worked). Institution building regularly has a huge amount of uncertainty over the viability of the respective arrangements. This is even more true the more sudden and far reaching institutional innovation is – which was, in particular, in the CEE countries the case. Secondly, not just parliaments but also the party system was transferred from the Western part of Germany to the new Länder. It cannot be underlined strongly enough that both citizens and political activists (which became the first generation of MPs) of the new Länder were close observers of politics in the Western part of Germany before 1989/90. They therefore knew relatively much about fundamental aspects of the political life in the West German democracy whose institutions and parties they were to copy. Therefore,

they knew about some of the incentives of these institutions and, most notably, party labels were to a considerable extent informational cues for them: This led to both, party oriented electoral behaviour of the citizens which contributed to faster learning as the democratic process was clearly structured by worthy party labels from the very beginning, and a self selection of political activist with regard to their party affiliation by taking into account the logic of party ideology, platform, and charismatic top politicians – this should have contributed to the cohesion of the PPGs. These processes, however, were not at work in the other cases depicted below. In particular, this was not possible for the CEE countries since they did not even had free access to information regarding the political life of Western Democracy. Thirdly, the transfer of the institutions was heavily supported by the West German Länder. They sent staff for the government and parliamentary administration, some MPs in the new Länder were directly imported from the West (Davidson-Schmich 2006b: 19ff, Könen 2009: 272ff), some parties accepted equally experienced and popular politicians as their leaders and, finally, all party organizations of the new Länder organized partnerships with West German party organizations in order to institutionalise the help having meetings and providing seminars. Among the assistance in understanding the institution, this led to highly effective processes of ‘model-learning’ (see Könen 2009: 272ff).

In sum, the PPGs of the newly democratized German Länder profited much from the institutions from which they know they would work, from transferred and valuable party labels which set up a party based political orientation for citizens and political actors alike, and, eventually, from the support of their West German colleagues in understanding and using the imported institutions. The proportion of convergence after the first or at least after the second legislative term can, therefore, be attributed much better to socialisation effects regarding both, shared values, beliefs, policy attitudes on the one hand and the logic of the system on the other hand.

These findings very much correspond to the pattern of convergence in the Reichstag of Weimar. There, in the first legislative term party unity has been slightly higher than in the first legislative term of the new German Länder (.92 compared to .89) and the pattern of convergence was remarkably smooth, too, and even a bit faster than in the new German Länder. Firstly, in Weimar most of the PPGs and its MPs have acted in the parliament before, namely in the Reichstag of the German Empire. From a cohesion perspective, they were already screened, selected, and had to a considerable extent a common socialisation. Secondly, the institution and its incentives have not been entirely new like in the new German Länder and, in particular, the CEE countries; essentially new has only been that the

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10 Note that seven years before the revolution, in 1982, chancellor Helmut Schmidt lost his office mainly due to troubles with the unity of his party, albeit it was staged as a coalitional conflict between Schmidt’s Social Democrats (SPD) and the Liberal Party (FDP). This was a prominent ‘didactic play’ for political observers in the logic of a parliamentary type of government and its demand for party unity.

11 Note that there was no MP who was able to get elected without a party affiliation. Further, it has to be taken into account that none of the revolutionary platforms from 1989 were successful in the 1990 elections – unless they did merge with an established party which was the case with Foundation 90 and the Greens. And, finally, party switching after the 1990 elections was rare (see for these findings Davidson-Schmich 2003, 2006a and in particularly 2006b).

12 In the second legislative term, PPGs of Weimar have been united by a unity score of .96, the PPGs of the new German Länder had a unity score of .93. They reached the score of Weimar not until the third legislative term.
parliamentary government replaced the monarchic type of government of the German Empire. Unfortunately, there is no data for the precedent parliament of the German Empire without the parliamentary principle. There is some data from 1905 and 1906 (Loewenberg 1967: 354) which, however, lacks comparability. Comparable data would have allowed for inferences on the impact of this institutional evolution on party unity. All in all, it comes with no surprise that in Weimar the pattern appears that smooth because well established PPGs ‘simply’ had to adjust some of their behaviour according to the incentives of the parliamentary principle.

Turning to data on Slovenia and Hungary, these do not show the evolution of party unity but give an impression of their solidity after the first decade. Quite considerably, despite the fact that PPGs in these CEE countries should have much more troubles getting into the business of a new political game with relatively new institutions and their incentives, and as they had to build up party labels and party identity almost from the primeval slime, they were quite united. Slovenian PPGs had a Rice score of .93 which had the same level of the PPGs of the new German Länders in their second and PPGs of Weimar in their first term. Hungary was in 2000 even more united (.96) meeting the level of the German Länders in their third legislative term and of Weimar’s second legislative term. Obviously, most of the troubleshooting was already completed and parties fit into their roles of being solid actors (but research on time series data is highly recommended in order to inspect the precise patterns). A very nice fit to the convergence pattern provide the data for Lithuania: There, PPGs have in the first full legislative term (1992-1996) a mean unity score of .95 which is between the score of the second and third legislative term of the newly established parliaments of the German Länders or the first and second term of the parliament of Weimar, respectively. But even these highly united PPGs raise their unity score in the subsequent legislative term up to a Rice score of .97. For these cases, however, the finding runs counter to the expectations that CEE parliaments should have more difficulties compared to the parliaments of the new German Länders. In Lithuania, however, the party system was highly unsettled in the years of the transition and the struggle for national independence (1990 to 1992). In the following years, the post-communists vs. conservative dualism was formed (not least due to the fact that the revolutionary nationalist movement Sąjūdis failed in the polls due to fierce intraparty conflicts before the 1992 elections). Additionally, the very rigid economic and social transformation of the Lithuanian society constituted a strict polarization over the country’s policies on the left-right dimension and its geo-political orientation (West vs. East) (cf. Tauber 2004: 171-173).

The Polish legislative terms after 1988 lost the beat compared to other newly established parliaments in CEE countries: The first term lasted only from 1991 to 1993, the second lasted to 1997. Unfortunately, the available observations for party unity only cover the legislative term after the 1997 and 2001 elections. It is therefore hard to compare the Polish Sejm with other CEE parliaments and the parliaments of the new German Länders of those times. Nevertheless, eight to twelve years after transition in the period of 1997 to 2001, the Rice scores seem to be a little bit low amounting only to .93 and, thereafter, in the period of 2001

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13 The data counts the number of votes with perfect voting discipline and division (there have only been analysed 21 votes). These data show that the left, in particular the SPD, was considerably united and that leftist, liberal and centrist parties were more prone to defection. It therefore seems adequate to state, that there is an effect to more party unity in Weimar due to the evolution of the parliamentary principle.

14 An outlier diminishes the overall level in 2003 before it turns back to the level in the 2005 votes.
to 2005 increased up to .96. This little delay, however, can be relatively easily explained within the theoretical notions of this paper. Poland had what might be called a transition to democracy with a ‘fidgety post-transitional order’. In 1991 the first fair and fully free elections for all MPs were conducted – rather late compared to the transitions of that time. Unlike other Central and Eastern States there were two, in essence, provisional constitutions or constitutional modifications, respectively (in 1989 and 1992). Not unless 1997 a constitution was in place and could be considered the final result of the processes which started early with the Solidarnosc protests in 1988. Therefore, the dataset comprises the first two Sejms after the rules of the game were fully determined. This should account for the fact that in Poland party unity scores increased and converged while in Hungary and East Germany this process had largely finished – a process that should have been driven largely by adaptation of actor’s strategies to institutional incentives: The Polish parties simply had to deal with things which were new to them when in Hungary and East Germany the systems were already settled and therefore relatively well known to its PPGs. Both, Hungary and East Germany, had no fidgety post-transitional order after 1989/90 and it is reasonable to assume that this is a factor in explaining why they were more consolidated with regard to their parties’ unity at this time.

In particular Poland had no stable party system even with regard to (some of) the parties brand names, their continuation or their affiliation to electoral alliances. For Poland this is true at least after 2001 when new parties were founded, three of which are included in the patterns depicted and analysed in this paper (PO, PiS, and LPR). All the three parties are rightist or even right populist parties. As they have unity scores of .94 to .96 they were relatively united in their first term in office (see below p. 17ff for a systematic test of parties ideologies as intervening factors). Slovenia had to some extent unsettled parties in their parliament, e.g. SKD (Slovenian Christian Democrats) and SLS (Slovenian People’s Party) merged in 2000 and a new party N.Si (New Slovenia) was founded by disappointed members of the newly established party (see Sever/Deželan 2004 and Lušič 2004). Hungary, a frontrunner of the revolutionary tensions in 1989, however, was a bit more stable. At least all of the four analysed parties, Fidesz, MSZP, SZDSZ, MDF, were part of the political scenery since 1990. Nevertheless, in Hungary minor parties appeared and disappeared or had quite a mixed electoral fate. As with many CEE parliaments after their transition to democracy, electoral volatility is remarkably high which should be an indicator of relatively weak party identification (see Bos 2010 for references regarding the CEE party systems). In sum, if one considers the highly problematic effects of such instable and volatile party systems, it is quite astonishing that Slovenian, Polish, and Hungarian PPGs found their way into highly united PPGs. Indeed, it is very plausible to attribute these effects to the logic of the parliamentary type of government and its party unity inducing incentives.

2. Relatively Chapped Patterns of Convergence

The analysis will now turn to patterns of convergence which are not as smooth as those which have just been analysed, the patterns of the PPGs of the German Bundestag and the French

15 Not to mention other indicators of party system institutionalisation such as electoral volatility, party identification of the electorate, number of parties, party switching.
Fifth Republic. Since these chapped patterns are chapped due to individual PPGs which do not easily fit into the overall patterns (or even prevent the research from detecting any), the following section will turn to PPG related explanations in particular.

For the German Bundestag, the overall patterns actually fit quite nicely the convergence hypothesis. There are two obvious peculiarities. Firstly, the process obviously takes longer: the convergence process is completed in the mid 70s, i.e. 20 years after the parliament was established. However, after ten to 15 years most of the convergence patterns which have been discussed above were almost completed. The Rice scores for party unity of the first and second legislative term, .88 and .87, respectively, are below the level of the PPGs for which data exist and convergence processes have been observed: the new East German Länder after 1990, the PPGs of Weimar in their first term, and the Lithuanian scores in the term after 1992. Secondly, there are obviously PPG specific patterns: The Social Democrats (SPD) are very united directly after 1949 while the Liberals (FDP) and Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) have an up and down pattern till 1969. In this year, there is a leap in the data series. Why?

That the German PPGs after 1969 have been considerably higher than before is due to the following phenomena. The SPD went into government forming the first Grand Coalition after 1949 together with the CDU. For at least three reasons this dropped their unity score before 1969 and pushed it after 1969. Firstly, there is the notion of a government-opposition divide: It seems plausible that governing itself is a strategic problem for party unity since it is always easier to be against something than to act cohesively in favour of a clearly formulated policy option (for which one will be hold accountable – in the worst case – throughout one’s life). On the other hand, some claim that governing in parliamentary types of government should give an extra pressure for unity as the government clearly depends on the unity of its MPs and they therefore simply cannot effort not to learn (cf. Deutsch 1963). In conjunction with this one has to take into account, secondly, the following moderating factor: The majority of the Grand Coalition was rather extensive which surely has diminished the pressure to rally around a party group position. After 1969, apart from the fact that the SPD had gained some experience in governing, the majority shrank much since the SPD now formed a coalition with the much smaller FDP. Since then the SPD maintained its high levels of party unity (ranging in their scores from .99 to .96) – albeit they never constantly reached the high levels of the four legislative terms after 1949 again. Turning to the question why this was the case, it is plausible to state that the SPD was considerably homogenous right after 1949 due to the very coherent socialisation patterns of its members: They were to a large extent socialized in the Weimar democracy and were called “Weimar traditionalists”. Therefore, the SPD is exceptional in that respect compared to the parties in post-communist democracies and post-1949 Germany (except the post-communist parties): There is no PPG in 1990 whose members had been acted in the same party in a democracy before (however, see below on the PPGs in the French Fifth Republic on p. 12ff). Further, the SPD’s party label was still worthy and an offer to identify with for politicians and citizens alike – at least as much as the party labels

16 See for a systematic test of the government-opposition divide below p. 17ff.
17 Interestingly, it was the essence of the strategy of the SPD leader, Herbert Wehner, to make the SPD ‘governable’ in the eyes of voters by forming a Grand Coalition with the largest opponent, the CDU/CSU. Obviously, this strategy also had a side effect as ‘training on the job’.
after 1990 in the new Eastern German Länder, if not even more. The coincidence of the centrally organized structure of this traditional social democratic party and the homogenous milieus from which the party activists and leaders were recruited18 plausibly led to the high levels of party cohesion which the SPD showed off from the very first days in the new German Bundestag. Both opponents in post-1945 German politics, FDP and CDU/CSU, were rather different regarding those aspects (see below) which justifies their lower entry level of party unity. And this helps understanding that the SPD after 1969 never again reached the high levels of party unity from the first days of the Republic: Milieus crumbled, organization got decentralized, the Weimar traditionalists spirit disappeared19, and the SPD turned into a party with very pluralistic views on what is social democratic (see on the particular SPD and their unity Saalfeld 1995: 191-96, 227ff, 311ff).

Further, the FDP’s unity scores resembled a roller coaster before 1965. Party unity was higher when the party was in opposition: after the 1957 (when the CDU/CSU governed alone) and after the 1965 elections (when SPD and CDU/CSU formed a Grand Coalition). Obviously, the strategic advance of an opposition party (i.e. not to have to act in favour of a bill but rather to refuse it) affects party unity. There are several reasons for the FDP’s problems with party unity (esp. in government). Firstly, the FDP had a comparatively huge turnover of their PPG’s MPs: 32 per cent in 1953, 51 per cent in 1957 and 43 per cent of their MPs in 1961. In the 1965 elections, however, the turnover was radically lower by only 18 per cent (see for the whole picture Saalfeld 1995: 205). Of course, if a PPG is constituted of a considerable large proportion of freshmen in each legislative period, this should do harm to stabilized learning effects. Secondly, the FDP was not a re-foundation of a political party of the Weimar Republic. It lacked the centralised party organization, which would have dealt with a well defined milieu from which it could recruit and socialise activists. Therefore, often locally routed and relatively independent MPs constituted this party group in parliament. Even more complicated, the FDP (re-)united a political reservoir which was disrupted in the Weimar democracy and whose party factions fought for influence and the identity of the newly founded liberal party: There was a fierce competition between the national liberals and the progressive and economical liberals (cf. Saalfeld 1995: 230). All these complicating conditions have helped to drop the unity scores for some time until most of the conflicts were solved and a new generation of liberals took over parliamentary business (see Saalfeld 1995: 337ff).

Additionally and most importantly, the process of convergence for the overall pattern is caused by the CDU/CSU which was significantly more united after 1969. Their Rice score increased from .87 to .99 when they went into opposition after the 1969 elections. This is a remarkable leap. Since then they never dropped below .94. Firstly, one has to notice, that the CDU/CSU, like the FDP, was a party which inherited several of the Weimar political reservoirs. For the first time in German history the CDU, and CSU in Bavaria, constituted one party for both, Protestants and Catholics. As they were parties whose overarching label was to

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18 Not to mention that it was the only party of post-1945 which was a fully democratic and even heroic opponent to the National Socialists attacks on the Weimar Democracy.

19 It might be noticed that the SPD leaders of the 70s were the second generation of post-1945 SPD. Both chancellors of that time, Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt, were born much too late to have active experience in Weimar politics.
be ‘Christian Democratic’, it also incorporated lots of factions which were to some remarkable extent a cross-section of all citizens: national and economical liberals, conservatives, workers, civil servants, agrarians; not least important was that the CDU/CSU, in particular in those times, were a very federal party formation with strong and self-confident organizations at the Länder level – not least this can be told from the fact that the CDU and CSU have been being two different parties which have been forming a single PPG throughout the history of the Federal Republic. As time went by, in particular the CDU built up a national party organization with a genuine party identification. This makes plausible to conclude that not learning inefficiencies were the cause for the pattern of party unity but, rather, a lack of cohesion and an obviously relatively diverse socialisation of this catch-all party group’s members (see Rueckert 1962). Although there is lots of explanation for a gradual shift to higher levels of party unity (more professionalization, the build up of a centralized party organization, and the necessity of MPs to prove themselves as party activists before gaining a candidacy), it is rather difficult to explain why the leap in 1969 was that large. To be in opposition was probably a kind of a relief (particularly after the Grand Coalition) for the still rather heterogeneous party which had governed since 1949. Furthermore, a leftward shift of the political climate (student revolts and a New Left, Gustav Heinemann from the SPD became President of the Federal Republic in 1969, professors of the Critical Theory were important actors in public discourse) should have supported the unity of the conservatives (as well as the ‘Neue Ostpolitik’, i.e. the new course of West Germany towards Eastern Europe and East Germany over which, then, the CDU/CSU began to have fierce intra-party conflict in the following legislative term explaining the observed drop of party unity in this period). (See for detailed analysis of both CDU and CSU Saalfeld 1995: 322ff.)

The two smaller parties in Germany, DP and DB/BHE, had to leave parliament (due to the five per cent threshold) before their unity score could consolidate on a higher level. However, the DP’s pattern resembles much the pattern of the FDP and the score for DB/BHE, in parliament only in the second legislative term, is on the level of the DP, FDP, and CDU in the first legislative term.

Finally, the pattern of the PPGs in the National Assembly of the French Fifth Republic is highly interesting. The starting point is quite differently structured compared to the parliaments discussed above. Firstly, the parliament itself is a seamless development of the National Assembly of the Fourth Republic, although the relatively heavy alterations of the parliament and the parliamentary principle (‘rationalized parliament’). Secondly, due to this seamless development all the parties of the first elections in the Fifth Republic pre-existed in some or the other way in the Fourth Republic or they represented a publicly well known political movements such as Gaullism. Turning to the pattern of the development of party unity one can state a remarkable process of convergence as it was intended by the architects of the constitution of the Fifth Republic which wanted to rationalize parliament. Party unity increased and cabinet instability increased as well, at least the latter was seen a major problem

20 Their turnover rates were significantly lower than those of the FDP: 1953 52 per cent, 1957 31 per cent, 1961 19 per cent, 1965 28 per cent (see Saalfeld 1995: 205).
21 Saalfeld 1995: table 7.2 p. 134 shows that the CDU/CSU suffered a loss in unity after 1972 particularly in motions with matters of defence (Rice score of only .84).
in the Fourth Republic (see below p. 22f). Since the period of 1978-81, France’s parliament is a good example of an assembly structured largely by solid PPGs. The specific institutions of the vote bloquée (which is a package vote induced by the government’s will) and the unique conjunction of a vote for a bill with a vote of censure (where the former is approved when the latter fails to be voted upon within 24 hours) contributed much to the observed levels of party cohesion: Votes on issues which are highly controversial within government PPGs can be prevented without having to fear the drawbacks of ‘surviving without governing’.

Although thereby the most problematic features of the Fourth Republic were prevented, the process of convergence was remarkably chapped, which can best be told from the standard deviation which was about .16 in the first legislative period and dropped, with a relapse in the late sixties and seventies, to a level below .03 in the sixth legislative term in 1978-81 and, since then, fluctuated between – roughly – .01 and .03. This is a considerable convergence pattern which is unique among the data at hand. This pattern has to be dealt with by turning to individual PPGs performance. Before that, however, it is necessary to deal with systematic conditions for the convergence process. Firstly and most importantly, the direct presidential elections (in place after the 1962 referendum on that constitutional innovation) institutionalized a clearly structured policy space and a less fragmented party system since national coalitions and campaigns were to be organized regularly. This was supported by the first-past-the-post electoral system with runoff elections. Parties got more and more recognition as a legitimate part of political life (a regime of public party finance was, however, not established until 1988). Secondly, since most parties in France’s Fourth Republic are not mass parties (due to the French hostility towards parties; however, except Communists, Socialists, and to some extent the Gaullists) it was easier to establish top down processes of decision making, most notable through the candidate selection (except for the Socialists where the departmental party branch is in charge and the Communists in the 90s after they gave up the principle of ‘democratic centralism’). This in turn helped to promote candidates who fit in the – increasingly important – national profile of the parties. Thirdly, party groups within parliaments were much stronger legally institutionalized than in the Assemblies of the precedent Republics and the agenda setting power was put in the hands of the majority – both developments made it much less attractive and, eventually, impossible to act as an independent political entrepreneur (for details on these conditions for higher party unity see Messerschmidt 2005).

Turning to the PPGs in particular, a first interesting observation is the low entry level of the Giscardists (Independents) (.61) and the Radicals (.63). The latter increased their unity score steadily until the third legislative term (after which the Radicals where not analysed by researchers anymore as most of its MPs joined the Socialist Party, PS). The Giscardists

\[\text{22} \text{ However, one should not miss the point that French political culture was hostile to parties (this is also true for De Gaulle who was the most powerful actor in the formulation of the constitution of the Fifth Republic).} \]

\[\text{23} \text{ Note that in the 1973-78 period the unity scores of the parties got closer to each other. The first presidential race under universal suffrage was in 1965. Therefore, it seems plausible to state that parties were so different in their unity scores at the beginning since the incentives for nationalizing politics trough presidential campaigning was missing (which was supported by the opportunity to be less united since the parliamentary rules of the vote of censure and the vote bloquée effectively compensated for some measure of indiscipline).} \]
increased until the third legislative term and then had a relapse in the sixties. Since then, the Giscardists showed unity scores in the zone above the .90 level.

The Radcials have been quite split over the opposition towards Gaullism. In the second term, many dissenters had already left the party joining the Gaullist camp. This made the party more homogeneous with regard to the opposition towards Gaullism. Nevertheless, the party’s opposition strategy remained controversial concerning the party’s cooperation with the leftist parties, the Communists and the Socialists. But this was only a minor aspect and did not express in lower unity scores since the party was united in their opposition against Gaullism. Additionally, electorally the party came under pressure which may have contributed to greater group solidarity. Both factors should have contributed to cohesion as the driving force towards more unity. After 1968, in the third term, the party finally split over the opposition strategy regarding the left alliance. This, again, did not express in the unity scores as the opposition to Gaullism brought the party together (Wilson/Wiste 1976: 476f). This shows how much opposition status may contribute to the unity of parties in voting, and it shows that voting unity itself is not under all circumstances a good indicator of a party’s cohesion. Compared with the Socialists, who also had a relatively divided party with lots of different factions, the Radicals have been quite disunited. This is due to the fact that the Radicals, unlike their socialist counterpart, is a liberal party in which the individual right to show one’s attitude in voting clearly outweighs the notion of solidarity to the groups inner majority vote (see below p. 17ff for a general test of this argument).

This is even truer for the Giscardists which very much preferred the notion of a vote of each deputy according to his individual assessment. This was a strong claim in this party and its ‘predecessor’ in the Fourth Republic which had been particularly disunited there, as well. The party had almost no extra-parliamentary organization and, hence, no socialisation processes of its deputies in a possible inner party sphere. Their low levels of party unity in the first term, therefore, come with no surprise. In opposition times, the parties’ deputies simply did what they did in the Fourth Republic: voting according to their own will. This low level of party unity in absence of a remarkable cohesion was also possible due to the lack of the pressure to learn. Indeed, in the second term, the Giscardists got more united as they clearly preferred the government to stay in office and, consequently, had to learn to be much more united in order to make governmental policies possible. They were even more united as the majority of the government shrunk in the 1968-73 term. However, soon after the strength of the majority increased, their unity score dropped to .86. The party, and this is a prime example of learning, recognized that it is in the interest of their voters not to let the government come down and therefore to discipline themselves or each other, despite the strong notion of individual voting. That the latter still was influential can be told from the relatively low Rice scores when they governed. However, for the specific low levels of the Giscardists (and Independents, respectively) this has been a remarkable increase in party unity (Wilson/Wiste 1976: 479f). The steady increase of the Giscardist’s unity score is a common trend which was driven by more division of labour, stronger leaders, more institutionalized extra-parliamentary (however, rather decentral) party organization, a more clear cut ideological position in the party system and more coherent (self) selection of party activists and candidates (for these general patterns of development which were more or less relevant to each of the PPGs see
The party, therefore, institutionalized important features to obtain strong performance in the parliamentary system and learned to act accordingly. And, further, it became less heterogeneous. Party unity declined in the nineties as inner party conflict rose which finally led to the formation of the Democratic Party out of a part of the Giscardists.

Another interesting pattern is the low entry level of the Centrists (.74) and the development of a high level of party unity until the fifth legislative period (thereafter they constituted a PPG with the Giscardists except for the period of 1988-93) which was an up and down process. This stands in stark contrast to the Centrist’s high levels of party unity in the Fourth Republic (who regularly had a Rice score of above .90). There is some evidence that, in contrast to the Giscardists, the Centrists were more divided due to their government portfolio in the first legislative term. Closer inspection of the votes with considerable low unity shows that the party was split over Gaullism and its policy implications. In 1962, all ministers of the Centrists left the government. In the 1962 elections they got the bill for being so divided and suffered heavy losses. Although, the Centrists were more united than in government years, they could not solve their strategic problem which was to decide whether to support the government or to oppose. They tried to support some policies and tried to push forward their own policies (see for all that Wilson/Wiste 1976: 478f). The two camps of occasional supporters and government oppositional MPs in one PPG explain the vast part of the relatively low levels of party unity. Finally, the PPG joined the Giscardist position. All in all, the Centrist’s problem in the Fifth Republic was that it tried to continue practices of the Fourth Republic which ultimately lead to their marginalisation. They are, therefore, an example of what may happen if one fails to adapt to the new institutions. One could also state that the Gaullist movement to some extent disturbed the policy space and confused the Centrists as they could not decide for an opposition strategy (as is true for the Radicals, see above).

The Gaullists entry level was with a Rice score of .85 not conspicuous for PPGs in new parliaments. They got above the .90 threshold relatively fast and had a relapse in the third legislative period. Gaullism, one has to take into account, was a movement which was very heterogeneous: it’s MPs ranged from conservatives to socialists and there were also lots of freshmen (Wilson/Wiste 1976: 481). This clearly explains the low entry level despite some necessity to support a government (quite similar to the CDU/CSU after 1949 in the German Bundestag). Besides this, some of the heterogeneity diminished due to the deselection of dissenters: Gaullist leaders expelled dissenters and tried to deny renomination (Wilson/Wiste 1976: 482). The relative decline of party unity to a score of .89 in the 1968-72 period can best be explained with the overwhelming majority of the party and the turbulences following the popular backlash against rebellious workers and students of the 1968 popular vote: There was a slight struggle of rightist and leftist Gaullists (Wilson/Wiste 1976: 481f). Interestingly, unlike De Gaulles withdrawal in the Fourth Republic, after his retirement in 1969 party unity remained high (Wilson/Wiste 1976: 482). This indicates that the party had much more cohesion due to ideological homogeneity and, in particular, due to shared historical experiences and, therefore, was much less a vehicle of a single leader. Gaullism, by the end of 1969, was an institutionalized part of the party system and not, as in the Fourth Republic, a
popular movement. Gaullist MPs and, to a considerable extent, their electorate believed in the clear cut opposition of Gaullism and Communism (Wilson/Wiste 1976: 484). This was the very foundation of their cohesion and it contributed much to the party’s unity. Electoral politics was polarized and – as noted above – opposition parties had troubles to find their strategy concerning Gaullism: Should they join the leftist opposition camp (this is what the Radicals eventually did), should they try to support the Gaullists and simultaneously trying to be an alternative to Gaullism (this is what the Giscardists did), or should they decide on a case by case basis (this is the strategy which the Centrists chose)? Hence, in France’s Fifth Republic new institutions came with a confusing re-arrangement of the party system and the policy space. Gaullism, although already a political force in the Fourth Republic, became the most influential political movement. Its appearance of a strong and tune calling role provoked proposals for new strategies which challenged to some extent the unity of parties, even such as the Centrist party which was considerably united under institutional settings where parties were generally not united.

The leftist parties, the Communists and Socialists, displayed almost perfect party unity. The Communists were as united as in the Fourth Republic. Communism was a political religion, in particularly in these times until the end of the Cold War. As noted above, in the Fifth Republic, Communism was the clearly visible end of the political continuum on the left corner, the most notable opposition party to Gaullism. Their MPs were strong believers and selected by the party leaders. Defecting was out of question. Their unity scores dropped not until the nineties when they gave up the doctrine of ‘democratic centralism’.

The socialist, however, are interesting since they are clearly a heterogeneous entity. They discussed much and with passion. However, unlike the Radicals, in the Socialist party there is a strong notion of group solidarity or – call it – ‘collective representation’ (Ozbudun 1970: 363-379). When decisions were made in the PPG’s conference, it was expected from all MPs to vote accordingly on the floor (Wilson/Wiste 1976: 474-76). Until 1988, socialists were in opposition which should have contributed to the remarkable high voting unity – in particular, since they contributed to the fundamental opposition of Gaullism in the highly polarized policy space of the post-1958 legislatures. However, one should notice that in their government period a decline in voting unity was not to state until the nineties. Obviously, for party unity it is sufficient to have a strong agreement over the end of the battle within a PPG and over the collectivist notion of party representation – despite strong factions or policy dissent.

As noted above learning effects and institutional incentives were present, but it has to be stated that ideological cohesion and the lack thereof strongly intervened the processes of strong party unity. The Gaullist impact on the policy space clearly provoked the following overall pattern in the French Fifth Republic: Parties from the left and far left are more united than centrist and rightist parties. This pattern holds despite the convergence process and disappears not until the 90s when the leftist parties were slightly less united. Considering the fact that the only far right party of the French Fifth Republic, the Front National, was highly

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24 Only some apparenté (i.e. MPs who are not members of the party but who joined the Communist PPG) defected in the time from 1958 to 1973 (see Wilson/Wiste 1976: 473).
united in their first legislative period (Rice score of .97), it is reasonable to state the following hypothesis: The farer away a political party is from the centre of the policy space, the more prone it will be to party disunity and, consequently, the more problems the PPG will have to increase party unity (see also Best 1990: 318ff on the party unity of PPGs in the German Frankfurt Assembly 1948/49; cf. Ozbudun 1970: 363-379 for a theoretical notion of a left-right divide in party unity).

3. PPG Related Causes of Party Unity After the Evolution of New Parliaments

After a closer look on the cases it can be stated that in systems where party unity increases after the set up of a parliamentary system the PPG related patterns may differ widely. These differences disappear when time goes by forming a pattern of convergence. It is, therefore, of interest which factors explain systematically why some PPGs are fully united from the very beginning while the unity scores of others increase or go up and down leading to chapped pattern of overall party unity convergence. In the previous sections of the paper some of such factors have been noted and were checked for their plausibility. This section takes them and tests their effects with statistical analysis. The data base comprises all the PPGs of the above discussed systems in the discussed time periods, i.e. there are several data points at different moments in time (N is 191). The basic explaining factor is ‘age of the current parliamentary system’ since learning and, in particular after the first legislative term, socialisation processes should lead to even higher levels of party unity (until nearly perfect party unity). In order to control for learning effects there will be a dummy ‘PPG is not in their first term after the set up of parliamentary government’ (score ‘1’). The learning hypothesis leads to the expectation that this will have a considerable effect on the constant of the regression equation. The comparison of means (table 4) underlines that this prediction is justified (not surprisingly since the scatter plots of each of the newly set up parliaments showed the same).

[insert table 4 here]

Other factors are the following.

PPG is located at the centre of the policy space: The farer away the party is from the centre of the policy space, the less prone the party should be of policy proposals from competitors which do harm to them. The scale is threefold with centre (‘0’), moderate left or right (‘1’), and radical or extremist (‘2’). This should also correspond to the collectivist and individualist notions of representation as liberal parties are centre parties in the analysed cases and socialist and communist parties are relatively radical parties (Ozbudun 1970: 363-379, cf. Wilson/Wiste 1976). From this information two dummies were constructed for ‘PPG is radical or extremist’ and ‘PPG is at the Centre of the Policy Space’. Comparison of the means leads to the conclusion of a striking effect in the predicted direction. Most united are parties who are at the poles of the policy continuum; least united are those parties in the centre of the policy space and whose ideology should lead to more individual notions of representation.

[insert table 5 here]

\[25\] Note that PPGs with less than ten seats were ignored throughout this paper due to small group inflation of party unity scores (Desposato 2004).
Shared revolutionary experiences: This is considerably interesting for those parties who have no tradition since one should expect shared experiences (score ‘1’) to have some effect on party cohesion. However, the comparison of the means does support this effect only very little.\textsuperscript{26}

[insert table 6 here]

Size of the majority: This metric variable takes into account – additionally to the government-opposition divide – that party unity should diminish in coalitions with many votes above the majority margin since it is costly for the party leadership and the government to built support beyond the necessities. However, the Pearsons r for this variable with the Rice Scores is remarkably low -.076.

Including all of these factors into a regression model (see model 1 table 2) the proportion of explained variance (R\textsuperscript{2}) is .27. All of the coefficients have the right sign. The model largely confirms predictions made by the hypothesis which states that actors adapt to the institutional incentive structure of parliamentary government quite quickly as the constant is high with .91. After the first term and additional proportion of .06 adds to the unity of the first term by which leads to the conclusion that learning improves collaboration within the PPGs. However, parties in the centre and with individual notion of representation are less united (-.02) while radical or extremist parties will have additional party unity by .03. Shared revolutionary experience adds additional .02 to the party unity score. The time effect raises party unity by .001 each year.\textsuperscript{27} Obviously, even after controlling for so many intervening effects, there is a time effect which can – in the light of the PPG related discussions above – be attributed to a process of socialisation. However, note that a legislative term is about four to five years on average which says that parties get even more united on average by .004 each term. And as predicted, a larger size of government majority contributes to lesser party unity by -0.08 for each additional percent of the majority – no matter whether the PPG itself is in government or not.

[insert table 2 here]

\textsuperscript{26} Data sources for all independent variables of this section are Norris (2009) and, in particular, the respective country chapters in Ismayr (2003, 2004).

\textsuperscript{27} Another way of capturing the time effect is to use an ‘age of party’ measurement because this should capture the fact that the parties’ members may have a socialisation before the current parliamentary government was set up (i.e. the age of the party can be older than the age of the parliamentary democracy). Both time variables are correlated by r = .470. The regression model, however, is largely the same although the respective $\beta$ is zero (R\textsuperscript{2} drops slightly to .251). A dummy for the ‘tradition of party’ measuring whether the political party of a given PPG has a single predecessor with a strong tradition (parties which do have such a predecessor have a valuable party label addressing voters, activists, and candidates leading to some homogeneity among the [self] selected MPs) does not contribute to a higher R\textsuperscript{2} if included in the model with the age of the current parliamentary government as the time variable (R\textsuperscript{2} drops to .266, $\beta$ = .003 which is rather low for a dummy and its t-value is considerably low: .315 [p-value = .753]). Bivariate correlation for tradition of party is also low: r = .024. Additionally, both findings are caused by a selection bias since most of the parties with a longer age than the parliamentary government and a strong tradition are leftist parties which always have a high level of party unity. One should, therefore, analyse leftist parties when they emerge. The only data available on this is the Labour Party’s score at Westminster in 1906 (.88) and 1908 (.94) reported by Beer 1976: table 9.3 p. 262. This score, however, was not conspicuous compared to the Liberal and Conservative scores (ibid.).
Although the size of government majority has a considerable effect on both, government and opposition parties, it is reasonable to control for the status of being a government or an opposition party. There are different notions on the impact of government or opposition status on PPGs’ unity. Some have found that opposition PPGs are less united and justify this due to the lack of incentives associated with holding a government in office (Davidson-Schmich 2006: 26). However, here the notion is that opposition parties (score ‘0’) have a strategic advantage because being against a measure does not have the same set of consequences than being expected to implement a certain policy like the government parties (score ‘1’). However, simply including the respective dummy in order to control for the respective effect leads to a lower R^2 of .26, a low β of .001 and a very low t-value of .066 indicating that the result is highly dependent on individual data points. This will be supported by the mean comparison which shows no significant differences between the two sub groups:

An even better form of controlling for the possible effects of the government or opposition status is to split populations according to this feature. The following model (see model 2 table 2) is for governing parties only (N = 86). R^2 is considerably high with .48 and the coefficients have the predicted directions. The governing parties’ time effect is a bit higher than in the model for the whole population (β = .002, above: .001). Most interestingly, the size of the government majority leads to a drop the Rice score of about -.18, i.e. almost 1 percent of the PPGs’ members defect (note the characteristic of the Rice index, here), for each percent of additional votes over the majority threshold.

Taking the dummy for radical or extremist PPGs out (since its t-value is very close to zero), will not affect the model’s other parameters.

Another model (see model 3 table 2) for PPGs in opposition (N = 104) shows coefficients with the right sign except for the size of the government majority. Most of the coefficients have troubles with the t-values and would not be significant if one assumes a normally distributed error in the research design (by case selection or measurement).

The effects and hypothesis regarding plausible causal explanation in the single case studies can be confirmed by a multivariate analysis. All in all, the explained variance is high enough

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28 However, the standard notion of the government-opposition divide could be adjusted for different party ideology and it specific notion of representation (collective/individual). Accordingly, an interesting hypothesis would be that liberal parties are more united in government years than in opposition years since the disciplining effects of the parliamentary government fuel party unity. In opposition years, liberal MPs prefer to act according to their individual assessment (cf. above p. 14f the pattern of the Giscardists in the French Fifth Republic). Socialist (or more broadly spoken: leftist and rightist) parties keep the notion that a party has to act collectively according to the majority within their party. This should be much easier in opposition years when there is the strategic advantage of being against the opposition. In government years, when votes have policy consequences, this should lead to a declining voting unity compared to opposition years. Intervening should be the strength of the majority which may diminish party unity in both instances. Indeed, in the dataset liberal parties have a mean Rice score of .94 when they are in government while in opposition they are slightly less united having a score of .92 (-.02) (N = 35). There are four instances in which Communists, Post-Communists or radical right wing parties were in government and this has dropped the Rice score from .94 compared to .96 (N = 29). Social democratic parties are in between since they are equally united in government and opposition (N = 45, Rice score is .97). Unfortunately, in multivariate analysis this is not fruitful, here, due to the very few instances in which, for example, Communists were in government.
to say that the predictive power of this model is acceptable. One should not forget that post-
transformational years are considerable prone for disturbances of social processes of many
kinds (situational, party specific, country specific) which could not be incorporated into the
theoretical notions and the models of this paper (i.e. the precise strategic situation of the
PPGs, the qualities of the leaders, the coaltional politics, the political issues and problems,
electoral prospects and so forth). The precise theoretically plausible and empirically replete
statements of the case oriented and variable oriented research therefore are the following. (1) 
Institutional incentives are strong to adapt the behaviour to the newly set up institutions of
parliamentary government. (2) Even after the first term, time is a predictor for further
increase, albeit the marginal effects seem to be rather low. This is in line with the theoretical
statement according to which homogenization within parties takes place, i.e. processes of
socialization lead to more cohesion. (3) However, party specific differences are large. (4) The
fact ,that PPGs with a shared revolutionary experience are more united underlines this. (5)
Besides this, in the time after the set up of a parliamentary type of government PPGs are
usually more united if they are located close to the poles (i.e. if they are extremist or radical)
and get less united when they are located more to the middle of the policy space. (6) The size
of the majority systematically drops party unity scores – which (7) is considerably true for the
governing parties.

Further research should also control for three other effect. Firstly, it was not possible to
control for turnover effects since comparable data is only available on the level of parliaments
and not as time series (see Matland/Studlar 2004). Secondly, the inner structure of the parties
should be controlled for, i.e. factions (however factions are, like PPGs, a problematic research
object since detailed and comparable data is seldom, cf. Trefs 2007). Thirdly, the tradition of
the parties should be taken more into account, despite it was hard to detect an effect in the
data set of this paper.29 It should be promising to ask, for example, whether there is an effect
of a (direct) predecessor who has been quite united (which was, here, not possible due to data
problems).

Finally, it is plausible to assume that legislative specialists around the globe select their
research questions problem oriented. Therefore, it might be that the results here are affected
by selection bias: those post-transitional systems where party unity was not a problem could
have been neglected. For future research, it is therefore highly important to systematically
investigate the nature of intra-parliamentary party competition in evolving democracies.

4. Some Remarks on Future Research

This section will turn to some remarks on future research on party unity in parliamentary
types of government. Firstly, it will turn the two cases with available data for which a pattern

29 It has also been tested for the effect of the dummy ‘party has a single predecessor with a strong tradition’. Parties were coded ‘1’ if there is a direct predecessor (e.g. many of the French Fifth Republic’s parties) or a predecessor who is not older than than 25 years (so that some personal continuity can be assumed, e.g. the SPD in Germany after 1945 whose predecessor was the Weimar SPD; East German parties whose programmatic, identity and party label was imported from West Germany were coded ‘1’, as well). The dummy, however, did not contribute much to the proportion of variance for a – data set specific – reason: Many PPGs with a strong tradition were in the French Fifth Republic – however the tradition they took over, was that of the Fourth Republic with poor party unity but not necessarily a poor party identity (e.g. the French Radical Party).
of convergence cannot be detected, the Czech Republic and the French Fourth Republic. For both systems it seems not entirely clear why party unity is so low – both are a riddle to the author of this paper. Secondly, this section tries to vitalize the findings of Cox 1987 for research on the evolution of party unity in parliamentary democracies by abstracting his argument. Thirdly, it will be briefly shown that the results of this paper and future research on this topic will be highly relevant for the evaluation of a possible trait of a parliamentarization of the European Parliament.

4.1 Deviant Cases – Relatively Low Levels of Party Unity in Parliamentary Democracies
The inspection of the scatter plots for the Czech Republic after 1993 and the French Fourth Republic show (see figure 1), that there is no time effect and, hence, there is probably no socialisation effect. From the learning perspective one has to state that actors do not have to learn since having these relatively low levels of party unity is probably not against their interest. Therefore, one has to assume that the cost-benefit structure of the respective institutions or majority situations (see above) simply does not make party unity an advantage in the political competition.

Czech Republic: Between 1998 and 2002 there was a minority government of the ČSSD which was backed by ODS for the full term. This effectively guaranteed to the ČSSD that its government will not be brought down with their votes (so called ‘opposition agreement’). Although ODS was considered the privileged partner of ČSSD motions, ČSSD could well consider or at least received the support of other PPGs (Linek/Rakusanova 2005). In this time, there was effectively a comfortable majority for the ‘governing’ parties ČSSD and ODS. The period before, from 1996 to 1998, ODS, KDU-CSL, and ODA formed a coalition government which comprised 99 out of 200 MPs – however, ČSSD backed them which effectively meant that the minority cabinet had a comfortable majority. The ČSSD/KDU-CSL/US-DEU government from 2002 to 2006 had, however, only a tiny majority of one seat and was not tolerated by anyone. The same is true for the coalition of ODS/KDU-CSL/ODA from 1993-1996 which had five seats over the majority threshold. – The party unity scores remained in both cases on low levels and in the period from 2002 to 2006 they even diminished slightly. The question is how they could govern? Sure, lots of votes are on technical bills or on bills which have to implement laws from the EU (Linek/Lacina forthcoming): This is the case in other parliaments either. And if bills were technical and unimportant, why do MPs obviously defect on such occasions, as well? Further, it was shown that on important bills party unity is higher (Linek/Lacina forthcoming). However, the effect is rather low and should not be overestimated: All in all, party unity in the Czech Republic is low, regardless of the bills importance and the majority constellation. Of course, there are bills concerning which parties vote in blocs against each other – but they seem to be rare. As Linek and Rakusanova (2002, 2005) point out, the most plausible factor of less unity simply is that in the Czech Parliament usually relatively large coalitions for a certain motion are build. Sure, this makes party unity less likely – or it may save transaction costs of forming a solid coalition. However, this is a rather proximate factor which is closely linked to the phenomenon in question. The concern should be to explain why opposition parties, for example, do not act united in order to impose high transaction costs on the government’s side of the House – with the aim of bringing them
into troubles and eventually down. So, why is there such a coalition building on a case by case basis possible which is fully unusual for the other parliamentary systems in the world? The Czech parliament simply poses the following question: How do governments organize support for their proposals among MPs and PPGs? And why has there not been any endeavour to bring down a government? Which proportion of the disunity which has been observed so far finds its way into the media and to the public knowledge? What do citizens expect, and what are the consequences for party labels by the disunited parties in the Czech Republic? Obviously, there are parliamentary types of government where no political force in parliament has an interest in bringing down the government, and where everybody knows this. Even tiny or minority cabinets survive as they can build support on their own PPGs, the tolerating PPGs and other PPGs on a case by case basis (e.g. Finland). But it seems to be unclear why this is the case.

France’s Fourth Republic: Quite strikingly, in France’s Fourth Republic there are two PPGs on the (far) left which had high unity scores, the Socialists and the Communists. However, while the Communists had been in opposition the whole period of the Fourth Republic, Socialists supported the government in the first and the last legislative term being only very slightly more united in their opposition years. The extreme right, the Poujadists, were considerably united, as well. Apart from this, all other PPGs had considerable lower levels of party unity. The MRP was ‘best of the rest’, with a relatively low unity score of .83. The Gaullists declined after De Gaulle temporarily retired from politics in 1953. UDSR, Independents and Radical Socialists were among the lower level; the Radical Socialists have been on the end of the field with a Rice score of only .76 on average. This is insofar remarkable as these three PPGs were the main supporters of the Fourth Republic’s governments. This brings about the following conclusion: Those party groups which formed the opposition to both, the government and the system as a whole, were much more united than the groups which supported them. In the literature this has led to the statement of the ‘disciplined despotism’ of anti-system parties and the ‘quarrelsome oligarchies’ of the supporting parties (Wilson/Wiste 1976: 469). Research on the government instability of the Fourth Republic shows that it can be attributed to both, disunited parties and coalition instability (MacRae 1967, Wood 1973). Sooner or later a decisive (intraparty) group of the PPGs which initially supported the government withdrew its support, typically after the government has fulfilled its programmatic role which led to its support. Most important for this study, there was no increase in party unity. The system is ‘stable’ with regard to party unity. With regard to the explanation of the low levels of party unity despite the parliamentary principle one can say the inverse to what had to be stated for the French Fifth Republic: there were no incentive to integrate the highly fragmented party system (no presidential elections, no two-round first past the post electoral system), the rights of the PPGs were weak (no entry and exit barriers for individual MPs, decentralized agenda setting power in parliament) while the rights of individual MPs were strong and governments could not be brought down without

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30 This was particularly problematic for the government process since, unlike in post-war Italy or Weimar, there was not only cabinet instability but – too – personal discontinuity of the ministers (Huber/Martinez-Gallardo 2004). Therefore, the whole political process lacked stability – which, eventually, led to a system which was not capable to meet its challenges.
the sanction of dissolution or the threat of non-confidence (since it was always possible to form a government on the basis of relatively tiny political projects to fulfil).

Albeit the author of this paper has not fully understood the causes of the observed patterns of party unity in the Czech Republic and the French fourth republic, comparative research may help to shed light on possible processes of party unity. This is even more necessary since in Finland, Sweden, and Norway there had existed PPGs with a rather low unity in the past. Interestingly, for these Scandinavian parliaments patterns of convergence could be observed over a long period of time (see Figure 2). That these patterns were driven by socialisation, however, is very unlikely since at the time of the 40s, 60s, and 70s, when the measurement took place, each of the PPGs had already a quite long tradition. Instead, some assume that the increasing party unity corresponds to an increasing work load of the parliaments, the corresponding division of labour within a PPG and the necessity of the deputies to rely on policy experts among their colleagues – this constitutes an interesting intervening variable.

Another aspect would be that in some countries it became standard that forming a government and supporting its bills are quite different aspects. In such a ‘government culture’ minority governments, changing majorities and individual deviancy from the party line might be possible.

Besides this, necessary comparative research should deal with systematic factors of the parliaments in parliamentary types of government, such as electoral systems, candidate selection methods, distribution of power in the executive-legislative nexus (dissolution, vote of confidence procedure) (cf. Kailitz 2008, Sieberer 2006, Bowler 2000). However, Cox 1987 shows that there is a factor whose missing leads to low levels of party unity even if the parliamentary type of government is in place.

### 4.2 Low levels of party unity in parliamentary types of government

Gary Cox (1987) analysed the increase of party unity in the 19th century Westminster parliament as an important cornerstone of the fusion of the government and the parliamentary majority, i.e. the ‘efficient secret’. For his argument one has to recognize that a parliamentary type of government, which was in place in Westminster at least since 1834, is a different

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33 Another aspect may be that there simply is a selection bias. Authors collected data on such cases where situational and time specific factors led to low party unity (such is probably the case with the Swedish data in the time of World War Second).

34 The King tried to install the government of Peel after he was not pleased with Melbourne. However, the parliament did not accept Peel and refrained from supporting his measures. After the elections of 1835 Melbourne was the only viable government under the parliamentary constellation and the king had to accept his
dimension than a democratic type of government. Westminster after 1834 was a non-
democratic parliamentary type of government. For the question of party unity it is sufficient
to state that the parliament under consideration is liberal, i.e. there truly exists the ‘free
mandate’ which constitutes the potential of the individual MP not to vote with his PPG.

Cox’ study shows that – while the parliament is liberal – the unity of the PPGs increases
parallel to the increase of the democratic competition. Most important in this respect is the
expansion of the suffrage in 1832, 1867, and 1884. Shortly after the reform in 1832 the
competition in the constituencies became more and more usual. Patronage, bribery and direct
influence of voters became less important since the electorate expanded. Pressure groups were
founded in order to influence more voters according to privat and social interests. This led to
a voter communication based on policies that were locally rooted. In parliament, the MPs had
to fight for these policies since this led to credibility through performance. This, then, gave
rise to lots of business in parliament and the raise of the cabinet which – step by step – got
more agenda power while the individual MP lost his power to initiate legislation (e.g., the
separation of private and government bills). Cabinets therefore formulated national policy
programs and voters, especially after 1867 and 1884, more and more voted according to the
individual MPs statement of support or non-support of the cabinet. Building teams of cabinet
supporters with specific national policy programs became more and more an advantage of
campaigning. And doing what one has promised in the electoral campaign increased the
chances to get re-elected – and therefore extra-parliamentary campaigning organisations were
established as well. Credibility could be raised by accountability: it was even more likely to
get re-elected, of course, if the same team which campaigned together stood together in
parliament, too, in order to implement the policy programs. An alternative team, the
opposition, acted according to the same rationale which, essentially, constituted the
competition of opposing teams for the voters support and the permanent care of the label of
these parties. Cox therefore stated that ‘the electoral pressure on individual MPs from their
constituents was lessened, and this was the key factor in reducing dissidence in Parliament’
(Cox 1987: 170). Daniele Caramani (2004) showed that this is also true for the voting
behaviour (in Great Britain and in other European Countries, alike): the voting results in the
constituencies converged to the national pattern implying that local interests were pushed into
the background and national issues dominated voting decisions. Party labels play the most
important role in this process since they stand for national policies: ‘The history of party
government is told through the history of party voting’ (Cox 1987: 169).

The point of this argument is that it is a statement on the genuine impact of the institutions on
party unity. It also supports the notion, that when democratic competition is less based on
party labels as the strong informational cues to political activists and voters, this may harm
the unity of the respective PPGs (e.g. after the transition to democracy when the parties are
fully new foundations). In contrast, PPGs like those in the new Länder in Germany after 1990
had a party label benefit from the import of party labels from the West German party system.
In a more general sense, weak party labels do harm to party unity. Weak party labels
themselves should be closely connected to and therefore serve as indicators of a defective
government. Since then the crown never again tried to install or even actively support a government which the
parliament did not accept (any longer).
democratic competition such as a large demobilization of voters and/or clientelistic linkages to voters. In the future, this could be an interesting research topic for comparative analysis of party unity.\textsuperscript{35} Note that one of the driving forces behind the stable system of parties and PPGs in the Fifth Republic was the process of ‘nationalization’ through the direct election of the president since 1965.\textsuperscript{36} It therefore seems fruitful to explore this nexus more in detail through comparative research.

This should also be done via historical research on party unity of emerging democratic parliamentary type of governments. Since Cox’ study surprisingly found no imitators among country specific analysis, this would be a very interesting task for future research of country experts: How did party unity develop shortly before and after parliamentarization? How did party unity develop during the increase of democratic transition?\textsuperscript{37} Another quite interesting question is when, how, by whom and with which intentions parliamentary reforms were conducted in order to cope with effects of a stronger democratic competition (e.g. with regard to agenda setting regimes, rights of the individual MPs and PPGs). These questions should also be addressed – \textit{mutatis mutandis} – to assemblies in presidential systems. However, to date we know almost nothing precise about the development of party unity in the age of democratization, despite this seems empirically interesting and theoretically highly relevant.

4.3 \textit{Party Unity in the Future of the EP}

This research is all the more important since it is highly informative for possible institutional developments of the European Parliament. To date, the value of the national party label is high but MEPs do not contribute to it since this is largely the job of national party leaders and since voters select according to national policy performances. The European party label of the European PPGs is by no means decisive and has, therefore, no value in the electoral battle. However, things may change if the European parliament and its decisions are going to be in the spotlight of the voters’ decisions, be it that the democratic deficit will be reduced or – much more effective – be it that the EU will get a parliamentary type of government (i.e. the Commission depends on the EP’s confidence).

The easiest way to do so is the parliamentarization of the European Commission, i.e. the President of the Commission who would become a European Prime Minister. This would make those parties competitive which find together in a ‘European political team’ presenting a candidate for the office of the President of the Commission and a policy portfolio for the next legislative term. Party labels would become highly valuable albeit it might well be that under the European label there are several country specific sub-labels – this, however, might also depend on the issues and problems which will be at stake in a respective series of

\textsuperscript{35} For comparative research on the value of party labels, for example the party identification and loyalties of voters see Norris 2004: 126ff, Payne 2007 and cf. Samuels 2006.

\textsuperscript{36} For example, Caramani 2004: 92f shows that France’s major shift towards less regional differences in voting behaviour occurred in the 1960’s. – It is also interesting that democratic competition is the impulse for reforms in the inner arrangements of the parliament (e.g., legal status of PPGs, agenda setting regimes), which was the case, for example, in the French Fifth Republic (Messerschmidt 2005) and in 19\textsuperscript{th} century Westminster parliament (Cox 1987). Obviously, actors try to adapt their institutions according to the challenges of democratic competition.

\textsuperscript{37} A good and comparable measurement of the extent of democratic competition is the participation compound of the Vanhanen-Index (see Vanhanen 2000).
elections and the policy alternative of potential competitors. It might well be that the party unity and the emergency of an extra-parliamentary organization will resemble the process of the CDU/CSU in Germany after 1949 as sketched above: Unity will rise as political identity and a common political manifesto gets elaborated and implemented. Depending on the European issues and the power of the EP, it may even be the case, that after a nationalization of the party systems (cf. Caramani 2004) there will be a kind of an Europeanization of the national party systems. The great unknown effect will be the difference of the national cultures and – most notably – the Babylonian problem of a diversity of languages.

Things would be different, of course, if the political system of the European Union takes the presidential trait. This may lead to relatively loose umbrella organizations and no strong party organizations. This could be an interesting option if one does not believe the possible European parties to overcome the problem of cultural diversity. Of course, in the presidential races one would expect – as was the case in the French Fifth Republic – a pattern of camp formation on the policy space (left-right, libertarian-authoritarian, eurofriendly-eurosceptical) with a respective higher level of party labels’ value and, probably, some increase in party unity. However, the latter will largely depend on the precise institutional setting of the presidential arrangement (cf. Morgenstern 2004, Kailitz 2008).

These very preliminary sketches show that in each case one should have in mind two important things. Firstly, party unity is nothing natural, despite it will be highly relevant for the political process, e.g. the strategic ability of political camps to implement policy. It is, too, not only a precondition of a clear competition among different policy proposals of different parties but it is also a factor which will be depending on the value of the parties’ labels and, therefore, not just a question of more democracy for the EU, but – rather – a question of the right democratic institutions. Secondly, what Walter Eucken, the great economist of the Freiburg ordo-liberal school of thinking, states for the achievements of the natural and technical sciences is still true today, in particular for the making of the European Union: We still have not found the order for our circumstances of living (Eucken 2004: 1). It is therefore worth to further unravel the intricate nexus of parliamentary government, party unity, party competition and party labels – through recent and historical comparative research.
Graphs and Tables

Figure 1: Scatter Plots of PPGs’ unity scores in time (parliament by parliament)
PPGs' Unity French National Assembly, IV. Republic, 1948+

- Communist
- Socialist
- Radical Socialist
- UDSR
- MRP
- Independents
- Gaullists
- Poujadists

Year

PPGs' Unity French National Assembly V. Republic, 1960+

- Communists (PCF)
- Socialists (SFIO, PS)
- Radicals (PR)
- Centrists (MRP/CD/CDS)
- Giscardists (Indépendents, RI, UDF, Centrists)
- Gaullists (UNR, UDR, RPR)

Achseltitel
Figure 2: Scatter Plots of Scandinavian PPGs’ unity scores in time (parliament by parliament)

PPGs’ Unity for the Norwegian Storting, 1970-94

- Worker’s Party (A)
- Conservatives (H)
- Christian People’s Party (KF)
- Centre Party (S)
- Liberals (V)
- Socialist Left (SV)
- Progress Party (F)
PPGs' Unity for the Danish Folketing, 1971-2008

- Sozial.
- Volksp. (SF)
- Sozialdem. (SD)
- Fortschritts p. (FP)
- Liberale (V)

Year

Rice-index

1 0.95 0.9 0.85 0.8 0.75 0.7 0.65 0.6 0.55 0.5
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<th>Parliament (time series)</th>
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<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
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<td>French V. Republic’s Assemblé National</td>
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Table 2: Regression Models

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<td></td>
<td>all PPGs</td>
<td>solely governing PPGs</td>
<td>solely opposition PPGs</td>
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<tr>
<td>constant</td>
<td>.908 / 41.380 / .000</td>
<td>.964 / 45.913 / .000</td>
<td>.849 / 21.123 / .000</td>
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<td>Age of Current Type of Parliamentary Government</td>
<td>.001 / 3.737 / .000</td>
<td>.002 / 5.104 / .000</td>
<td>.001 / 1.554 / .124</td>
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<td>PPG Not in First Term After Set Up of ParlGov</td>
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<td>.049 / 3.649 / .000</td>
<td>.070 / 3.028 / .003</td>
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<td>PPG is Located at the Centre of Policy Space</td>
<td>-.019 / -1.761 / .080</td>
<td>-.022 / -2.163 / .034</td>
<td>-.013 / -0.692 / .491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPG is Radical or Extremist</td>
<td>.031 / 2.312 / .022</td>
<td>.009 / .386 / .700</td>
<td>.043 / 2.161 / .034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared Revolutionary Experience of PPGs’ Members</td>
<td>.023 / 2.320 / .022</td>
<td>.038 / 3.555 / .001</td>
<td>.019 / 1.101 / .274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of Government Majority</td>
<td>-.078 / -2.066 / .040</td>
<td>-.183 / -4.816 / .000</td>
<td>.021 / .327 / .744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R² / corr. R²</td>
<td>.294 / .270)</td>
<td>.517 / .481</td>
<td>.241 / .188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nr</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Cases</td>
<td>Remarks on the Rice Scores</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Davidson-Schmich 2003</td>
<td>Germany: PPGs in Parliaments of all new German Länder (except Thuringa) 1991, 1996, 2000</td>
<td>unweighted standard Rice Scores</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Debus/Hansen [im Erscheinen]</td>
<td>German Reichstag (Weimar) (1920-1932)</td>
<td>unweighted standard Rice Scores</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Ilonszki/Jágerr 2011</td>
<td>Hungarian Országgyűlés (2000, 2003, 2005)</td>
<td>unweighted standard Rice Score</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Kistner 2007</td>
<td>Polish Sejm 2001-2005</td>
<td>unweighted standard Rice Scores</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Könen 2009</td>
<td>Germany: Parliament of Brandenburg 1990-1999; Germany: Parliament of Saxony</td>
<td>unweighted standard Rice Scores</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Linek/Lacina</td>
<td>Czech Poslanecká snemovna (1993-2009)</td>
<td>unweighted standard Rice Score</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Lukošaitis 2004</td>
<td>Lithuanian Seimas (1993-2000)</td>
<td>presumably unweighted standard Rice Score</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Messerschmidt 2005</td>
<td>French V. République’s Assemblé National 1973-2002</td>
<td>unweighted standard Rice Scores</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Saalfeld 1995</td>
<td>Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949-90</td>
<td>unweighted standard Rice Scores</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Sever/Dežela n 2004</td>
<td>Slovenian Državni zbor (2000-01)</td>
<td>unweighted standard Rice Scores</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Wilson/Wiste 1976</td>
<td>French IV. République’s Assemblé</td>
<td>unweighted standard Rice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>Scores</td>
<td>Republik: N = 889; V. Republik: N = 357</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946-58; French V. Republic’s Assemblé National 1958-73</td>
<td>unweighte d standard Rice score</td>
<td>not taken into account</td>
<td>not taken into account</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zielinski 2001 Polish Sejm (1997-2001)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Data sources:**


Linek, Lukáš; Lacina, Tomáš: Chapter 10 – Voting in the Chamber of Deputies between 1993 and 2008: participation, unity, and the role of the political parties. Tabelle 10.2


* The data source is written in Lithuanian. Efforts to consultate Mr. Lukošaitis have failed.
Table 4: Comparison of Means, PPGs in first term and other

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PPG Not in First Term</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Std. deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>After Set Up of ParlGov</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPG in first term after the set up of current parl. government</td>
<td>0.885533</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0.0980997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPG after its first term</td>
<td>0.955448</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>0.0492052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insgesamt</td>
<td>0.944467</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>0.0644849</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Comparison of Means, Difference of PPGs Ideology from the Centre of the Policy Space

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Difference of PPG's Ideology from Centre</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Std. deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideology is extreme (i.e. communist, extreme/populist right)</td>
<td>0.979364</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0.0263774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology is moderat left/right (i.e. christ./soc. dem., socialist, conserv., leftist/rightist)</td>
<td>0.945003</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>0.0649838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology is rather centric (i.e. centre parties) or pronounced individual (i.e. liberals, greens)</td>
<td>0.924068</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>0.0698699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insgesamt</td>
<td>0.944467</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>0.0644849</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: Comparison of Means, Shared Revolutionary Experiences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Shared Revolutionary Experience of PPGs'</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Std. deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PPGs' members do not have common revolutionary experiences</td>
<td>0.942603</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>0.0674748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPGs' members have common revolutionary experiences</td>
<td>0.948961</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>0.0569525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insgesamt</td>
<td>0.944467</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>0.0644849</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7: Comparison of Means, PPGs Governing Status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governing Party (governing/not governing)</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Std. deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PPG does not govern</td>
<td>0.946710</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>0.0720036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPG governs</td>
<td>0.941728</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>0.0542017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insgesamt</td>
<td>0.944467</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>0.0644849</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
References


